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Recent corporate scandals reveal opposing perspectives on the
ability of rank-and-file employees to be corporate monitors. From
one perspective, the scandals demonstrate employees' efficacy as
monitors with accurate insider knowledge about the inner workings
of their corporations. At great risk to their careers, a few employee
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whistleblowers bravely attempted to expose wrongdoing at many
corporations involved in recent scandals, such as Enron, Worldcorn,
Global Crossing, and several mutual fund companies.'
Viewed differently, however, the scandals also illustrate the
difficulty of relying upon employees to function as effective
corporate monitors. The financial misconduct at Enron and other
.~
companies lasted for years before being revealed p ~ b l i c l y Countless
lower-level employees necessarily knew about, were exposed to, or
were involved superficially in the wrongdoing and its concealment,
but few disclosed it, either to company officials or to the public.3
Thus, while the corporate scandals demonstrate employees' potential
to monitor corporations, they also confirm that this potential often is
not fully realized.
The most recent attempt to encourage employees to become
more effective corporate monitors is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, passed by Congress in response to corporate scandal^.^ The
Act utilizes two approaches to encourage corporate whistle blower^.^

1. See discussion i n p a Part 1I.B.
2. For example, immediately prior to declaring bankruptcy in December 2001, Enron
restated its earnings for each year between 1997 through 2001 because of the accounting
problems that occurred during that time. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIALINVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEEOF THE BOARDOF DIRECTORS
OF ENRON COW. 2, 32 (2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicrepo~/
sicreport020102.pdf.
3. See discussion i n p a Part 1I.B; cf: Rebecca Goodell, The Ethics Resource Center's
Survey of Ethics Practices and Employee Perceptions, in CORPORATECRIME IN AMERICA:
STRENGTHENING
THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION,PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND
SYMPOSIUMON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 159, 160 (1995)
[hereinafter GOOD CITIZEN](presenting survey result that one in three employees witnessed
significant corporate misconduct). Of course, many employees worked at these corporations
without any reason to suspect wrongdoing. See BETHANY
MCLEAN& PETERELKIND, THE
SMARTESTGUYSIN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS
FALLOF ENRON239
(2003). Rather than focus on these employees, this Article is concerned with employees who
have reason t o suspect fraudulent conduct but do nothing about it.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 1 5 & 18 U.S.C.).
5. A third model, the Bounty Model, has proven to be a particularly effective means of
encouraging whistleblowing by giving financial incentives to whistleblowers. See Elletta
Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for
Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-82 (1992) (listing
examples of various rewards to whistleblowers provided by federal and state statutes). The
Bounty Model, however, is not extensively applied to encourage the reporting of fraud against
corporations themselves (as opposed to fraud against the government) and, unlike the two
models discussed in this Article, was not implemented in response to the corporate scandals.
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The first is best described as a version of the well-known Antiretaliation Model, which involves protecting whistleblowers from
g . ~ second
employer retaliation after they disclose ~ r o n ~ d o i n The
approach, labeled in this Article as the Structural Model, requires
that corporations provide employees with a standardized channel to
report organizational misconduct internally within the c ~ r p o r a t i o n . ~
While academic and public attention has focused almost
exclusively on Sarbanes-Oxley's version of the Anti-retaliation
Model: this Article is the first comprehensive academic work to
analyze the ability of Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to engage
corporate employees in the battle to reduce corporate fraud.
Utilizing social science research that analyzes whistleblower
motivations, I conclude that the Structural Model may produce
more effective disclosures from whistleblowing employees than prior
attempts t o encourage whistleblowing because the Model addresses
two significant problems that previously kept employees from
consistently functioning as successhl corporate monitors: (1) the
corporate norm of silence, and (2) the corporate tradition of
blocking and filtering employee whistleblowing.

Accordingly, although it is an intriguing idea that deserves hrther study, applying the Bounty
Model to prevent fraud against corporations is beyond the scope of this Article.
6. See MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWINGTHE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGALIMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES
AND EMPLOYEES
232 (1992);
Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Teny Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99,100 (2000); Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 273-78.
7. The structure of the channel can be fairly simple, such as designating an internal
officer to receive such reports or setting up a "hotline" for employees to call. Organizations
also might install more complex reporting systems, complete with ombudsmen who handle
employee reports, ensure anonymity for the employees, investigate their concerns, and provide
employees feedback on the outcome of the investigations. See, ea., Marlene Wifield,
Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in WHISTLEBLOWIN~UBVERSIONOR CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP?21, 24 (Gerald Vinten ed., 1994) (describing the ombudsmen system
implemented by Otis Elevator Company); Alan R Yuspeh, Sharing uBest Practices"
Information, in GOODCITIZEN,supra note 3, at 84.
8. See, ea., STEPHENM. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER
h W : A GUIDETO LEGAL
PROTECTIONS
FOR CORPORATEEMPLOYEES
(2004); Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and
Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 875 (2002); Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the
Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for
Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004); Robert G. Vaughn, America's First
Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2005);
Ashlea Ebeling, Blowing the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistle, FORBES.COM,June 18, 2003,
http://www.forbes.com/2003/06/18/cx~ae~0618beltway~print.html.
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The Article begins by explaining the background of recent
corporate scandals and the two whistleblower models found in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The specific examples from recent corporate
scandals set forth in Part I1 of the Article illustrate the two problems
that relate to the flow of employees' inside knowledge of
wrongdoing. Part I1 first discusses how, during the scandals,
employee information about wrongdoing did not flow readily.
Despite having inside knowledge about corporate misconduct,
employees rarely spoke out about wrongdoing because of a
compelling norm of silence among employees.9 Second, Part I1
addresses how on the rare occasion when employees spoke out,
corporate executives typically blocked or filtered the information
provided by employees before it reached traditional corporate
monitors, such as the board of directors or the government. While a
few "successful" whistleblowers overcame these two problems,
thousands of other rank-and-file employees did not.
Part I11 of the Article describes the two approaches utilized by
Sarbanes-Oxley to address these problems-the
Anti-retaliation
Model and the Structural Model. Ultimately, the Anti-retaliation
Model implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley is not sufficient alone to
address these flow-of-information difficulties. By contrast, SarbanesOxley's Structural Model offers significant improvements over
versions of the Structural Model utilized prior to recent corporate
scandals. Namely, the Act requires that corporate boards of public
companies establish avenues (i.e., structures) for employees to report
wrongdoing directly to independent directors on the board's audit
Furthermore, Sarbanescommittee-not to corporate exec~tives.'~
Oxley made the implementation of this disclosure channel
mandatory."
Social science research can provide a framework for analyzing the
effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model. Accordingly, Part
IV of the Article evaluates Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model
through this lens and suggests that it is more likely than the Antiretaliation Model to reduce the flow-of-information problems that
9. See, ea., Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND.
L.J. 101, 119-23 (1995); Terance D. Miethe & Joyce Rothschild, Whistleblowing and the
Control of Organization Misconduct, 64 SOC. INQUIRY 322,332-37 (1994) (finding low levels
of whistleblowing after discovery of misconduct).
10. SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 1 5 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2002).
11. See id.
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contributed to recent corporate scandals because the Structural
Model provides a direct and legitimate disclosure channel from
employees to the board of directors. The Structural Model
encourages more whistleblowing because it provides incentives to
increase employee participation as corporate monitors and reduces
various disincentives to employee whistleblo~ing.'~Equally
important, this direct channel to the board should encourage
effective whistleblowing by circumventing information blocking and
filtering by corporate executives.13 In this way, Sarbanes-Oxley's
Structural Model minimizes the principal-agent problem that arises
when employees provide information about misconduct to mid-level
managers and corporate executives who cover-up or ignore the
fraud. Furthermore, the model should provide several secondary
benefits to corporations and their employees, such as improving
corporate decision-making, reducing monitoring costs, and
increasing employee voice within the corporation. Such benefits may
lead to greater acceptance and implementation than pre-scandal
attempts to encourage whistle blower^.'^
Although it is an improvement over prior approaches, SarbanesOxley's Structural Model still suffers from significant flaws. Thus, the
Article concludes in Part V by explaining the inadequacies of
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model and offering several suggestions
for improvement. One problem is that the Model may not work well
enough. That is, corporations may implement disclosure channels
that appear sound on paper but d o not work in reality.15 This
"cheating" problem can be addressed in several ways. First,
corporations could disclose information regarding their
whistleblower system. For example, corporations might publicize the
structure of their whistleblower disclosure model in order to advise
shareholders and employees of the extent of their system. Similarly,
corporations could be required to disclose various metrics regarding
the effectiveness of their disclosure channel, such as the number and
type of complaints and the resolution of those complaints.
Shareholders, employees, and government regulators could evaluate
the effectiveness of a whistleblower disclosure system through these

12. See discussion infia Part N . A .
13. See discussion infra Part N . B .
14. See discussion infin Part N.C.
15. See discussion infia Part V.B.

disclosures. A second way to address the cheating problem is to
provide corporations with a true incentive to create effective
whistleblower systems by permitting a limited safe harbor for
corporations that implement verifiably effective whistleblower
channels prior to any wrongdoing.
The converse of the cheating problem presents another potential
difficulty: the model may work too well. Complaints from employees
may overwhelm directors and prevent them from efficiently and
sufficiently addressing the complaints, much less attending to their
obligation to oversee the business of the company.16 Addressing this
"noise" problem may require the SEC to promulgate regulations
that reduce the burden on directors, while still requiring director
oversight of the information obtained through a whistleblower
disclosure channel. For example, the SEC may explicitly permit
directors to outsource initial review of such disclosures to ethics
officers or third-parties that report directly to the board rather than
to corporate executives. Approving sufficient, but limited,
whistleblower structures through regulation may prevent
corporations from implementing inefficient and cumbersome systems
in order to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley's vague mandate.
Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model is an
improvement over prior attempts to encourage whistleblowing
because the Act requires a structure that will encourage
whistleblowers and help them effectively provide information about
wrongdoing to corporate officers with the power to address the
misconduct. But, in its current form, Sarbanes-Oxley fails to properly
balance the need for employees to disclose important inside
knowledge to independent directors with the need for directors to
efficiently and effectively monitor all aspects of a corporation's
business.

16. See discussion inpa Part V.C.

11 12
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11. THENEED TO ENCOURAGE
MOREEFFECTIVE
WHISTLEBLOWING

A. Information Problems and Traditional Corporate Monitors

Effective corporate monitoring benefits corporate shareholders
and employees, as well as the general public.17 Traditional
monitoring occurs through a variety of overlapping means. A board
of directors monitors a corporation's professional management on
behalf of the shareholders, who are too dispersed and diverse to
monitor management themselves.18 Professional corporate
gatekeeper^,^' such as auditors and attorneys, provide outside
monitoring of corporations that protects shareholders as well as the
investing public.19 Further, the government monitors companies
through government inspectors and by requiring various corporate
reports to be filed.20
A primary advantage of each of these traditional corporate
monitors is that they are external to the company. Independent
directors purportedly provide dispassionate oversight of
management.21 Gatekeepers have reputational concerns outside of

17. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christine J. Johnson, Managerialism, Lgal Ethics,
and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 316; Reinier H. Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of k g a l Controh, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 863 (1984);
Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH.ST. L. REV. 279,280-85.
18. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on
the Role of Congress, in ENRON:CORPORATE
FIASCOSAND THEIRIMPLICATIONS 495,498 &
n.14 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron's
Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71 U . CIN. L. REV. 1167, 117074 (2003); Ribstein, supra note 17, at 285.
19. See, eg., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-10 (2004); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON.& ORG.53, 54
(1986).
20. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. 2002) (requiring public companies to make
periodic filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission). Government-like entities, such
as various securities listing agencies like the New York Stock Exchange, also monitor
corporations.
21. Director independence can enhance the objectivity of the board because
independent directors are not as dependent on short-term corporate results to maintain their
position with the corporation. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal
Control, 19 CARDOZOL. REV. 237, 244-50 (1997); Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better
Watchdogs:Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate h g a l Practice, 84 MINN.L. REV. 1213,
1237 n.lOO (2000). Moreover, independent directors may be more willing to disclose

their contractual relationship with corporations to inspire them to
provide effective monitoring.22When the government enforces laws
and regulations, accountability to the public at large keeps regulators
from being influenced by the corporation's own goals.
Despite the advantage of external monitors, however, their
external position presents a significant challenge: monitoring the
inner workings of a company from the outside.23External monitors
must rely upon information they receive from corporate executives to
fulfill their monitoring
Even under the best
circumstances, this information is certain to be incomplete and selfserving due to information blocking and filtering by executives and
subordinate managers.25 Under the worst circumstances, corporate

wrongdoing publicly because they can d o so without losing their employment. See Eisenberg,
strpra, at 2 4 4 4 8 ; Kostant, supra, at 1237 n.lOO.
22. See, ea., Coffee, supra note 19, at 308; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 61 n.20,94.
23. See Kostant, supra note 21, at 1239-40. For example, the independence of a
director may only exacerbate the informational asymmetries that already exist. Outside
directors "devote but a small portion of their time and effort to the firm." Bainbridge &
Johnson, supra note 17, at 310; see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of
Groupthink, 71 U . CIN. L. REV.1233, 1250 (2003) (noting that directors have information
gathering problems because they only meet a few times a year). Therefore, they can have
difficulty undersanding the inner workings of the company they are charged with monitoring.
See Eliot Spitzer, Keynote Address, Symposium: Enron and Its Aftermath, 76 S T . JOHN'SL. REV.
801,807 (2002).
24. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner
Circles, 8 3 OR. L. REV. 435, 460 (2004); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and
Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK.L. REV. 1313,1349-50 (2005).
25. Information blocking and filtering occurs when information is withheld by
subordinates, and "communication upward [is] highly filtered and correspondingly
inaccurate." John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective h g a l Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1144 (1977)
(quoting R Liert, A Motivational Approach to a Modtped Theory of Organization and
Management, ia MODERNORGANIZATION
THEORY184, 195-96 (M. Haire ed., 1959));
Kostant, supra note 21, a t 1239-40. This blocking and filtering has numerous causes,
including:
(a) a shared feeling on the part of subordinate officials that they owe their loyalty
chiefly to senior management and not to the board; (b) a belief that the board is
interested only in "hard" quantitative information, such as capital costs, financial
ratios, and expected rates of return; (c) a sense that "everybody knows anyway,"
coupled with the perception that the board would rather not be put on formal
notice as to the ugly "facts of life" of doing business abroad; and (d) a "lack of
congruence" between the interests of the corporation and the career aspirations of
individual corporate officials.
Coffee, supra, at 1131; see also Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO's Role in
Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1209-10 (2005) (describing research
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executives may &rmatively hide or misrepresent information in
order to evade a monitor's oversight. Thus, flow-of-information
problems can arise because these traditional corporate monitors do
not have enough information, and the information that they do have
is often distorted and filtered.
These problems contributed t o the failure of traditional monitors
to detect the wrongdoing at the center of recent corporate
scandals.26Certainly the greed of corporate executives triggered the
massive fraud:' and traditional corporate monitors should have been
Other systemic issues
more active in their oversight respon~ibilities.~~
also contributed to this unprecedented failure in corporate
governance, such as internal incentives to inflate stock prices caused
by managerial stock options.29 There is sufficient blame t o go
around.30However, as discussed below, one of the most glaring-yet
regarding the distortion and filtering of information from subordinates to superiors in
hierarchical organizations).
26. The failings of the traditional monitors in these scandals, particularly with regard to
Enron, have been exhaustively detailed elsewhere. See, ea., Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15;
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1 1 2 5 4 3 (2003); John R Kroger, Enron, Fraud,
and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U . COLO. L. REV. 57, 59-60
(2005).
27. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 280-81; Greg Ip, Greenspan Issues Hopeful Outlook as
Stocbs Sink, WALLST. J., July 17, 2002, at A1 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan in a July 16,2002 speech in which Mr. Greenspan blamed an "infectious greedn for
the corporate scandals); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat:
Lessonsfi.om Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of
Internal Controls, 9 3 GEO. L.J. 285, 286 (2004) ("Indeed, unrestrained greed has now
become the standard trope in the social construction of these events.").
28. Fanto, supra note 24, at 435-36; O'Connor, supra note 23, at 1235-36; POWERS
ETAL.,supranote2,at22, 148.
29. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 304. Other explanations include: a "'bubble'
atmospheren fueled by new business techniques and a lack of investor skepticism; see Ribstein,
supra note 17, at 281; the legislative undermining of private securities liability through, among
other things, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; see andrk douglas pond
cummings, aAin't No Glory in PainD: How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital
Markets, 8 3 NEB. L. REV. 979, 1044 (2005); and a judicial tightening of burdens of proof for
demonstrating aiding and abetting liability in violation of federal securities law; see cummings,
supra, at 1023-24, 1048 & n.320 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 51 1 U.S. 164 (1994)).
30. See Kroger, supra note 26; Paredes, supra note 18, at 503 ("Many things
contributed to Enron's demise. There were breakdowns all around-accountants, lawyers,
securities analysts, and credit rating agencies (the 'gatekeepers'); the SEC, and the board of
directors, not to mention the underlying corporate misconduct. Even the 'victims'--the
i n v e s t o r A e a r some responsibility for seemingly, perhaps understandably, becoming

under-analyzed-facts regarding the scandals is that the information
concerning the fraudulent conduct was available to rank-and-file
employees for years. Problematically, this information either never
made it to the traditional corporate monitors or was so filtered that it
did not inspire any of the monitors to end the misconduct until
shareholders lost millions of dollars of value in their investment^.^'

B. Overcoming Information Problems-Employees as
Corporate Monitors
Corporate employees could be instrumental in solving the
inherent information problems of traditional external corporate
monitors. Employees have an information advantage over traditional
corporate monitors because they have more complete knowledge
~~
regarding the inner workings of a large c ~ r p o r a t i o n .Financial
misconduct on the scale that occurred during the recent corporate
scandals necessarily requires the assistance of low- and mid-level
.~~
even
employees because of its scope and ~ o m p l e x i t yAdditionally,
if an employee does not participate in the wrongdoing, corporate
accounting and finance employees, who are trained in the proper
complacent after historic bull markets and failing to ask the tough questions of Enron's
management that should have been asked.").
31. T o some extent, this problem is not new. During corporate scandals in the 1970s
relating to corporate bribery of public officials, Professor Coffee noted significant problems
with information flow to the board of directors. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1127-28.
Corporate officers systematically kept information about the bribery from the board of
directors, and the hierarchical structure of the corporation cut off subordinates who attempted
to raise red flags. See id. at 1133-34. Writing in the early 1980s, Alan Westin also lamented the
harmhl results that occurred when corporate management blocked information from
employees regarding illegalities taking place within the corporation. See Alan F. Westin,
Introduction to WHISTLE-BLOWING!
LOYALTY AND DISSENTIN THE CORPORATION
1, 10-12
(Alan F. Westin ed., 1981).
32. Although the statement that employees have better information about corporate
conduct than outside monitors seems rationally based on common sense, Ralph Nader put it
nicely in his early work on corporate whistleblowers:
Corporate employees are among the first to know about industrial dumping of
mercury or fluoride sludge into waterways, defectively designed automobiles, or
undisclosed adverse effects of prescription drugs and pesticides. They are the first to
grasp the technical capabilities to prevent existing product o r pollution hazards. But
they are very often the last to speak out, much less t o refuse to be recruited for acts
of corporate or governmental negligence or predation.
Ralph Nader, An Anatomy of Whistle Blowing, in WHISTLEBLOWING:THE REPORTOF THE
CONFERENCE
ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3 , 4 (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972).
33. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH.U . L.Q. 357, 374 (2003); Ribstein, supra note 17, at 286.
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methods of conducting business, should recognize when corporate
~ ~ fact, even with few
actions fall outside legal b ~ u n d a r i e s .In
corporate or legal incentives provided to whistleblowing employees,
roughly one-third of fraud and other economic crimes against
businesses are reported by whistle blower^.^^ Given their central role
in corporate activity, information from rank-and-file employees is
essential to uncovering wrongdoing in a timely manner. Accordingly,
effectively encouraging employees to disclose their knowledge of
wrongdoing is a critical step in discovering fraud and other corporate
misconduct.
1. Thefew who succeeded

Unlike the traditional corporate monitors during the recent
scandals, some corporate employees successfully identified and
reported the corporate fraud, particularly at WorldCom, Krnart, and
several mutual fund companies. These whistleblowing employees
succeeded for two reasons. First and foremost, they simply spoke out
and disclosed their inside knowledge regarding the corporate
misconduct. Second, the successhl whistleblowers spoke out
eflectively by disclosing their information directly to traditional
corporate monitors rather than to corporate executives.
The most famous example of a successhl individual employee
whistleblower may be Cynthia Cooper, the former head of internal
.~~
uncovered a wide variety of illegal
auditing at W ~ r l d C o r n Cooper
accounting practices at WorldCom in 2002 and reported the
illegalities directly to WorldCom's Board of Directors. The Board
publicly admitted the financial manipulations and fired WorldCom's
CFO Scott Sullivan, who allegedly orchestrated the fraud and tried
to stop Cooper's investigation.37By reporting Sullivan's misconduct

34. See Richard Alexander, The Role of Whistleblowers in the Fight b a i n s t Economic
Crime, 12 J. F I N . CRIME131,131 (2004).
35. See Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 n.37 (citing study reported in Jonathan D .
Glater, Suwey Finds Fraud's Reach in Big Business, N.Y. TIMES,July 8,2003, at C3).
36. See Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 45, 46-47.
Cooper was named, along with Sherron Watkins of Enron, as one of Time Magazine's People
of the Year in 2002. See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME,Dec. 30,
2002, at 31,32-33.
37. See Ripley, supra note 36, at 49. WorldCom ultimately filed for the largest
bankruptcy in American history. See Ken Belson, WorldCom's Audacious Failure and Its Toll on
an Zndumy, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 18,2005, at C1.

directly to the Board, Cooper successfully avoided Sullivan's attempt
to block disclosure of the fraud.38
Other whistleblowers were similarly effective because they
disclosed information directly to the government, another traditional
corporate monitor.39 For example, separate, anonymous
whistleblowers brought to light fraud at Symbol Technologies and
Krnart when they sent letters to government reg~lators.~'More
recently, the mutual fund industry paid hundreds of millions of
dollars to settle charges arising out of allegations made by employee
whistleblowers to government investigators regarding improper
practices in the i n d ~ s t r y . ~ '
38. Ethics hotlines also helped whistleblowers succeed. At Duke Power, a call from an
employee whistleblower to the company's ethics hotline in July 2001 led to the company's
payment of a $25 million fee to state regulators. See Alix Nyberg Stuart, Whistle-Blower Woes,
C F O MAG., Oct. 2003, at 51, 52, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3010455?f
=related; Melissa Davis, Enron Aside, Whistle-Blowers Still Withering, THE~TREET.COM,
May
29,2003,hnp://www.thestreet.com/-tscs/
stocks/melissadavid/10090120.html.
39. T o be sure, some whistleblowers also were successful because they disclosed
information directly t o the public, either through the media or an individual lawsuit. For
example, a former Dynegy employee gave papers about "Project Alphan-a financial vehicle
implemented by Dynegy to exaggerate cash flow and reduce taxes-to the Wall Street Journal,
which led t o an SEC civil securities-fraud case that the company settled for $3 million, a
shareholder lawsuit, and resignations of senior executives. See Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett,
1"histle-Blower Reels fiom Actions' Fnllout, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 17, 2001,
http://www.careerjoumal.com/myc/survive/20021217-sapsford.h~l. Also, after receiving
allegations in a whistleblower lawsuit about marketing fraud related t o its relationship to
Burger King, the Coca-Cola Company conducted an internal investigation and ultimately
offered t o pay Burger King $21 million to compensate for the fraud. See Stuart, supra note 38,
at 52.
40. In April 2001, an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter t o the SEC alleging that
Symbol Technologies engaged in improper accounting. After three years of government and
internal investigations, Symbol restated earnings for five years and the government indicted
seven former senior executives for accounting fraud. See Steve Lohr, Ex-Executives at Symbol
Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES,June 4, 2004, at C1. In its restatements, Symbol reduced revenue
by $234 million and net income by $325 million. See id. Symbol also settled investor and SEC
lawsuits for $138 million. See id. In January 2002,an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter
about corporate wrongdoing t o Kmart's board and t o government officials that resulted in at
least two criminal indictments, which were allegedly based upon improperly recording
payments t o overstate Kmart's earnings. See Constance L. Hays, 2 Eeoficials at Kmart Face
Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 7,2003,at C1.
41. See Jayne O'Donnell, The Guy Who Blew the Whistle on Adtnam, USA TODAY,Nov.
20, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/2OO3-11-20
-whistleblower-la-cover-x.htm.Putnam Investments alone paid nearly $194 million to settle
claims that investors were hurt by the practice of market timing. See Jon Chesto, Mass. Market:
Whistle-blower Law Needs Updating; No Qne Rewarded in 5-Tear History, PATRIOTLEDGER,
July 9, 2005, http://1edger.southofboston.com/articles/2005/07/09/news/news06.txt;
60
Minutes II: Meet a Major-Leagrre Whistleblower (CBS television broadcast Feb. 18,2004)(text
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Alone, these whistleblowing employees could not stop corporate
misconduct; but by providing information directly to traditional
monitors, the employees circumvented the barriers corporate
executives erected to shield external monitors from uncovering
wrongdoing.

2. The many who failed
The success of these few individual whistleblowers does not
indicate that employee whistleblowing worked effectively. Rather,
the small number of successful whistleblowers highlights the overall
failure of corporate employees to promptly identi@ and report the
wrongdoing occurring in these companies and others, such as
Enron. Employees failed in two respects. First, employees failed to
speak out; and second, when they did, they failed to effectively
report the misconduct they witnessed.

a. Failing t o speak out. Unlike the few successful individual
whistleblowers, the vast majority of knowledgeable employees failed
to reveal wrongdoing because they were unable or unwilling to speak
out. The misconduct at many of the corporations affected by recent
scandals occurred over a period of several years.42 During this time,
rank-and-file employees certainly participated, at some level, in the
improper practices that led to the fraud.43 For example, when
of interview available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stries/2004/07/07/6OII/pnntable
628000.shtml).
42. For example, the fraud at Enron was ongoing for at least four years before the
company filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 2, 32.
The amounts involved in the restatement are staggering. As set forth in the Powers Report, the
restatement
reduced Enron's reported net income by $28 million in 1997 (of $105 million
total), by $133 million in 1998 (of $703 million total), by $248 million in 1999 (of
$893 million total), and by $99 million in 2000 (of $979 million total). The
restatement reduced reported shareholders' equity by $258 million in 1997, by
$391 million in 1998, by $710 million in 1999, and by $754 million in 2000. It
increased reported debt by $711 million in 1997, by $561 million in 1998, by $685
million in 1999, and by $628 million in 2000.
Id. at 3. The HealthSouth fraud may have lasted as long as fifteen years. See Kurt Eichenwald,
Key Executive at HealthSouth Admits to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 27, 2003, at C1. It "ranks as
one of the biggest, and perhaps the most blatant, in corporate history." See Melissa Davis,
HealthSouth Spotlight Turns to Ex-Auditor, THE~TREET.COM,May 22, 2003,
http://www.thestreet.com/_tscs/stocks/melissada~d/lOO89204.h~.
43. At Enron, for example, the misrepresentations and the improper accounting
practices that led to Enron's bankruptcy were long-standing and well-known throughout the

corporate executives at Enron made outlandish profit predictions,
employees knew they must "gin . . . up" earnings and revenues to
match the predictions.44 Thus, executives may have hatched
accounting scams, but often their underlings were sent to do the
dirty work of executing the plan despite the underlings' knowledge
that such accounting was illegal.45
Furthermore, even if employees did not directly participate in the
fraud, employees often knew that something in the corporation was
amiss. At Enron, for example, knowledge about earnings
manipulation was so widespread that employees joked about it at
company parties.46 For months prior to Enron's bankruptcy filing,
numerous employees knew that executives' public statements about
Enron's financial strength were not true and that the company's
business was failing.47But despite their lengthy exposure to flawed
financial practices and public misrepresentations, few employees
Importantly, this failure to report is not
came forward to ~ornplain.~'
unique to Enron. In fact, studies reveal that the majority of
corporate employees who witnessed wrongdoing did not report it.49
Successhl whistleblowers, by definition, overcame this inherent
hesitation to speak out.
company. See, ea., MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 116; id. at 182-83 (giving examples
of employee knowledge of Enron's practice of inflating sales numbers); id. at 219-20, 230,
269-70 (discussing wide-spread employee knowledge and participation in various strategies to
manipulate California's energy market); see also id. at 303-04, 332.
44. See id. at 289.
45. See Davis, supra note 42 (noting that the CEO of HealthSouth admitted to
directing the company's auditing staff to inflate the company's earnings); Kenneth N. Gilpin,
&-Rite Aid Oflcials Face U.S. Charges of Financial Frattd, N.Y. TIMES,June 22,2002, at A1
(noting that the indictment of the CFO for Rite Aid alleged that he coordinated the
accounting fraud by "instructing less-senior employees in the accounting department to make
unsupported entries in the company's books and records that did not meet generally accepted
accounting principles").
46. See MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 296.
47. See, ea., ROBERTBRYCE,PIPE DREAMS: GREED,EGO, AND THE DEATHOF ENRON
2 4 6 4 7 (2003); MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 230,303,332.
48. There are exceptions, of course. In March 2001, one Enron employee sent an
anonymous letter to Fortune magazine to complain that company executives were understating
the extent of recent job cuts. See MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 332.
49. Several studies have found low reporting rates among employees who witness
misconduct. See, ea., MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 96-99; TERANCED. MIETHE,
WHISTLEBLOWING
AT WORK: TOUGHCHOICESIN EXPOSING
FRAUD,WASTE,AND ABUSEON
THE JOB 31 (1999); Estlund, supra note 9, at 119-20; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at
332-33 (surveying six studies of whistleblowing and finding that the average rate of
whistleblowing is forty-two percent).
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b. Executive blocking and filtering. A second flow-of-information
failure occurred because of executive blocking and filtering of
whistleblower reports, so that even if employees spoke out, their
disclosures of wrongdoing were ineffective. Many whistleblowers
reported information to corporate executives rather than to
traditional corporate monitors, such as the board of directors.
Executives subsequently prevented such information from reaching
corporate monitors in order to protect the company from penalties
and scandal.50Such problems were apparent in many recent cases of
corporate fraud;51 however, the fraud at Enron presents the clearest
and most well documented example.52
At the core of the Enron scandal were "massive accounting fraud
and irregularities, a principal feature of which was the use of
structured finance techniques designed to get debt off Enron's
balance sheet and inflate Enron's profits."53During the course of this
fraud, Enron executives successfully blocked many employee
complaints regarding improper or illegal business tactics by
.~~
responding to any complaint with hostility and o b f u ~ c a t i o nFrom

50. See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1313-14.
51. For example, in August 2001, a Global Crossing vice president for finance wrote the
company's Chief Ethics Officer claiming that the company was engaging in improper
accounting techniques. See FRANKPARTNOY,INFECTIOUSGREED362-63 (2003). The top
executives at the company never sent this letter to its Board or its auditors. See id. at 363.
52. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1518 n.4 (2004) (listing the "staggering amount of scholarship on
Enron"); Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll &Mr. Skilling: How Enron's
Public Image Morphcd from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most
Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON:CORPORATEFLASCOSAND THEIRIMPLICATIONS, supra
note 18, at 77, 8 7 (noting that since Enron's bankruptcy filing, Enron books "have become
their own cottage industry"); id. at 8 7 11.36 (listing dozens of books published about Enron).
See ~enerallyPOWERS ET AL., supra note 2 (including an investigative report by special
committee of the Enron Board of Directors).
53. Paredes, supra note 18, at 503.
54. See BRYCE,supra note 47, at 135, 149-50,294; MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3,
at 308-09; Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, in ENKON:
CORPORATEFIASCOS AND THEIRIMPLICATIONS, supra note 18, at 927, 9 3 7 ("Those who
objected often found themselves the subject of pressure, downright abuse, and exile."); Tim
Mcguire, More Than Work: Many Yelled 'Fire!' at Enron, But Deceit Drowned Them Out,
WINSTON-SALEM
J . , Aug. 21, 2005 ("That was a clear pattern at Enron: If anyone suggested
wrongdoing, they were considered a hindrance and ousted."). Several researchers have
described anecdotal evidence of management hostility to underlings who report wrongdoing as
typical of reactions to whistleblowers. See, ea., Alan F. Westin, Conclusion t o WHISTLE-

the company's earliest days, Enron executives silenced and
undermined employees who raised concerns about Enron's
accounting and financial practices.55This information blocking grew
increasingly problematic by the late 1990s, when employees
repeatedly complained to Enron's risk assessment group and
corporate executives about the off-balance sheet "special purpose
entities" that became the center of the Enron scandal.56 These
complaints never made it to the Board of Directors, which, on three
separate occasions, waived Enron's Code of Ethics and approved the
conflicts of interests these entities created.57 Enron's Board never
substantively investigated the propriety or long-term impact of these
en ti tie^.^' Furthermore, in early 2001, as Enron's businesses began
to show signs of strain, a few employees reported to corporate
executives that large losses were being hidden.59 Executives
disregarded these reports and never completed internal
in~esti~ations.~'
At least one employee wrote a signed letter to
Enron's management and the Secretary of the Board in which she
detailed the misrepresentations about Enron's earnings.61The letter,
however, was never shown to Enron's Board of D i r e ~ t 0 i - s . ~ ~

BLOWING!LOYALTY AND DISSENTIN THE CORPORATION131, 132 (Alan Westin ed., 1981);
see nlso Westin, s:qrn note 31, at 10-12.
55. See BRYCE,supra note 47, at 38-42 (describing actions by Ken Lay in the late 1980s
to cover up internal reports regarding falsified bank statements and illegal payments to
corporate officers); M C L W & ELKIND,supra note 3, at 94-95 (describing 1994 complaints
by Jim Alexander regarding internal accounting issues).
56. See BRYCE,supra note 47, at 160, 226, 231; MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at
192-93, 308-09; POWERSET AL., supra note 2, at 1 6 6 6 7 (describing complaints by Jeff
McMahon t o Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's President and COO, regarding the failure of controls to
protect Enron from Andrew Fastow's conflict of interest in creating the special purpose
entities).
57. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 148-65; Paredes, supra note 18, at 503. As
Professor Paredes noted, by utilizing these special purpose entities that he individually
controlled, Enron's CFO, Andrew Fastow, "stood to make millions by, essentially, negotiating
against Enron." Id. at 503. The Board hardly discussed this massive conflict of interest or how
to monitor it. See M C L W & ELKIND,supra note 3, at 193. There is no indication that
internal employee concerns with the arrangements ever reached the Board. See id.
58. See BRYCE,supra note 47, at 16445,228-29.
59. M C L W & ELKIND,supra note 3, at 299-304 (describing internal investigation of
Enron Energy Services by Wanda Curry, an Enron accountant, which uncovered hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of "unacknowledged, speculative trading losses").
60. Id.
61. See id. at 358-59.
62. See id. at 359.
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Even when employees avoided management's information
blocking, corporate executives often filtered or slanted employee
reports before the information reached the monitors. For example,
was unsuccesshl
Sherron Watkins, the famed Enron ~histleblower,6~
in stopping Enron's fraud because the information she disclosed
about misconduct at Enron was sanitized before it reached the Board
of Directors. Watkins's error was that she complained to Enron's
CEO, Kenneth Lay, rather than to the h l l Board of Directors.@ Lay
subsequently hired the law firm of Vinson & Elkins to investigate the
allegations-the very same law firm that approved many of the
~ ~ the Board
transactions about which Watkins ~ o m p l a i n e d .When
ultimately learned of Watkins's allegations, the report was
whitewashed by Vinson & Elkins's conclusion that the transactions
Watkins reported were proper.66Thus, by hand-picking his friends at
Vinson & Elkins to investigate Watkins's claims, Lay successfully
filtered Watkins's h l l allegations from reaching the Board and the
Although Watkins certainly deserves credit for her
63. See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 36, at 32-33 (naming Watkins a "Person of the
Yearn).
64. In August 2001, Watkins reported her concerns regarding the accounting problems
t o Lay, first in an anonymous letter, and subsequently in a meeting with Lay. See Cherry, supra
note 8, at 1036-37 & 11.31; Leslie Griffin, Whistleblowing in the Business World, in ENRON:
CORPORATEFIASCOSAND THEIRIMPLICATIONS, supra note 18, at 209, 210-11. Watkins
presciently warned of her concern that Enron might "implode in a wave of accounting
scandals." Memorandum from Sherron Watkins t o Kenneth Lay (Aug. 15, 2001), available a t
http://energycommerce.house.gov/l07/he~O2142002Hearing489/tab1O.pdf.
For a
more lengthy description of Watkins's role, see BRYCE,supra note 47, at 293-99, and
MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 354-58.
65. See POWERSET AL., supra note 2, at 173; Griffin, supra note 64, at 213-14. Lay
justified this choice by concluding that the investigation would only be "preliminary" and
could be conducted most quickly by V h o n & Elkins because the law firm was "familiar" with
Enron. See POWERS ET AL.,supra note 2, at 173. However, as noted by Enron's own Boardled investigation after the bankruptcy filing, "[tlhe result of the V&E review was largely
predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and the process employed." Id. at
176.
66. See MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 366; POWERSET AL., srbpra note 2, at
173-77. At the Board meeting, a Vinson & Elkins attorney "assured the audit committee that
[the Watkins letter] wasn't a problem; his preliminary investigation had already concluded
there was no need to look any further. No Enron director asked to see Watkins's letter . . . and
there was no specific discussion of her concerns about the [special purpose entities]." MCLEAV
& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 366.
67. Eventually, Watkins unveiled much of Enron's "fuzzy" accounting to the
government during her testimony to Congress in February 2002. See The Financial Collapse of
Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm.
on Energy @ Commerce, 107th Cdng. 14-66 (2002) (testimony of Sherron Watkins).
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willingness to step forward and report her concerns to Enron's CEO,
she ultimately was not eflectzve as a whistleblower because she
provided information to Enron's executives rather than directly to
Enron's B ~ a r d . ~ '
Finally, any conceivably problematic information that did make it
to Enron's traditional monitors often was discounted or ignored
based upon the close relationship between the monitors and Enron
executives. Enron's Board, although ideally independent on paper,69
never effectively questioned Enron's management regarding its
financial practices." Moreover, "gatekeepers," such as Enron's
outside accountants and attorneys who received huge fees from
Enron, did not raise red flags to anyone on Enron's Board even
though they knew Enron's aggressive accounting techniques were
problematic.71 The close relationships between purportedly
independent monitors and Enron executives led to "group think"
that prevented such monitors from dispassionately fulfilling their
responsibilities and questioning information provided by corporate
executive^.'^ Unfiltered information from employees, however,

However, these public disclosures occurred only after Enron filed for bankruptcy in December
2001 and Congress discovered her initial memo t o Lay. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at
32.
68. Despite the public accolades she received, Watkins's ineffectiveness as a
whistleblower has been criticized. In his well-regarded book regarding the collapse of Enron,
Robert Bryce entitled his chapter on Watkins "Sherron Watkins Saves Her Own Ass." See
BRYCE,supra note 47, at 293; Griffin, supra note 64, at 220-21; see also Dan Ackman,
Whistleblower?,WALLST. J., Dec. 24,2002, at A10.
69. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 6 9 U . CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002);
Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004
MICH.ST. L. REV. 541, 542.
70. See Kostant, supra note 69, at 542.
71. See BRYCE,supra note 47, at 298; POWERS ETAL., supra note 2, at 17, 24-26; see
also Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17, at 301 ("All too often, lawyers acted as facilitators
and enablers of management impropriety."); Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15 (discussing
accountants' role); Gordon, supra note 69, at 1237 (discussing accountants' role); Gordon,
supra note 26, at 1138 (noting that lawyers had "the capacity to create endless shells under
which to hide and move the peas"); Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2227 (2004) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("Lawyers'
negligence almost certainly contributed to the wave of corporate scandals that shook the
securities markets in 2001 and 2002.").
72. See Fanto, supra note 24, at 441-42, 446-49; O'Connor, supra note 23, at 125793. "Group think" involves a "culture of silence" in which corporate leaders discourage critical
discussions and influence from individuals outside of the corporate "inner circle." Fanto, suprn
note 24, at 469; see also O'Connor, supra note 23, at 1242-55 (asserting that whatever
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might have forced these monitors to fulfill their oversight
responsibilities despite their close relationship with Enron
management.
Most commentators ignored the role of corporate employees in
these scandals and, instead, blamed the failures of the traditional
corporate monitors for the success of the deception^.'^ In part, this
blame is well deserved: the duties of traditional corporate monitors
to investigate potential misconduct are more pronounced and
formalized-and their authority to intervene is more apparent-than
the duties and authority of rank-and-file employees. Yet thousands of
employees participated in, knew of, or willfully ignored the massive
Such information
misconduct occurring within their c~mpanies.'~
would have been useful to corporate monitors, perhaps leading to
earlier discovery of the fraud.
The corporate employee's potential as an effective corporate
monitor cannot be ignored. A response to the recent corporate
scandals should be to encourage more employee whistleblowing and
to encourage effective whistleblowing by assisting employees in
avoiding the problems of blocking and filtering by corporate
executives. The remainder of this Article examines whether the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes the best means of implementing these
goals.
111. Two WHISTLEBLOWER
MODELS
Both the Anti-retaliation Model and the Structural Model
existed before recent corporate scandals, yet neither model effectively
encouraged employees to disclose information about corporate

information is received by directors often is analyzed in the context of norms of building board
cohesiveness that make it difficult to test and question what is being told to them).
73. See, ea., Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17,at 301 (blaming attorneys); Coffee,
supra note 19, at 313-15 (blaming outside auditors); Fanto, supra note 24, at 435-37
(blaming corporate directors).
74. See, ea., Neal E . Boudette & Joann S. Lublin, Delphi Discloses New Irregularities in
Its Accounting, WALLST. J., June 10,2005,at A3 (noting that although Delphi Corporation's
"treasury staffwas aware of the [undisclosed] off-balance sheet debt," no one reported it to the
company's CEO, the "board of directors, or credit-rating agenciesn). After the scandals,
recovering corporations realized the danger of having employees who remain silent in the face
of financial misconduct. New management at both WorldCom (now known as MCI) and Tyco
fired employees and executives who likely knew about financial improprieties. See Joseph
McCafferty, Adelphia Comes Clean, CFO M A G . , Dec. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/301105l/l/c~3036074?f=insidecfo.

fraud. As part of its response to the scandals, Congress implemented
versions of both models in the Sarbanes-Oxley
A. InsufJiciency of the Anti-retaliation Model

Academics widely praised the anti-retaliation provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley
calling it the "gold standard" of whistleblower
protection77and "the most important whistleblower protection law
in the
For the first time, millions of employees would be
protected by a national statute against r e t a l i a t i ~ n . ~ ~
The Act provides a broad definition of retaliation. Employers
may not "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any
The Act also
other manner discriminate" against whistlebl~wers.~~
provides extensive remedies for employees injured by retaliation for
whistleblowing. Discharged employees may be reinstated and may
receive compensatory special damages, including litigation costs and
attorneys' fees.81 Furthermore, individuals may be criminally

75. The other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley alter corporate governance on many fronts.
Among other things, the Act established a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to
govern accounting firms, established rules regarding auditor and director independence,
enhanced the requirements for financial disclosures, increased criminal penalties for certain
white-collar crimes, and altered responsibilities for various corporate players, such as audit
committees, corporate attorneys, corporate officers, and securities analysts. See generally
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 & 1 8 U.S.C.).
76. The anti-retaliation provision is part of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002, which is Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See id. § 806
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2000)). Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provisions have
been thoroughly described and analyzed in other places. Seegenerally KOHNET AL., supra note
8 (analyzing legal requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision); Vaughn, supra
note 8 (also analyzing legal requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision).
Accordingly, I will only briefly outline its provisions here.
77. See, ea., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM.L. REV. 319, 376 (2005).
78. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 105; see also KOHNET AL., supra note 8, at xii (stating that
the whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are "the most systematic whistleblower
protection framework enacted into federal lawn). But see Cherry, supra note 8, at 1034
(concluding that Sarbanes-Oxley is a "half-measure and not the true reform that securities law
needs to respond to corporate kaud").
79. See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3.
80. See 1 8 U.S.C. $ 1514A(a).
81. See id. § 1514A(c); see also KOHN ET AL., supra note 8, at 111 (noting that
Sarbanes-Oxley is one of only four federal statutes that permit recovery of attorneys' fees as
part of "special damages" that must be awarded); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 9 7 n.400 (noting
benefits of reinstatement as a remedy).

Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model
prosecuted for retaliating against whistleblowers, which seemingly
would further deter potential r e t a l i a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Unlike many federal anti-retaliation statutes, an employee
victimized by retaliation may bring a private cause of action under
Sarbanes-Oxley in federal district court. Although an employee's
claim must first be brought to the Department of Laborspecifically, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)-a court claim may be brought if the administrative process
is not completed within 180 days,g3which rarely happens.84
Yet Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision suffers from
significant limitations. The Act only protects employees of public
corporations and only if such employees report violations of federal
securities laws.85 Its statute of limitations period of ninety days is
unreasonably short because it does not give employees enough time
to deal with the after-effects of retaliation, consider their options,
hire an attorney, and have the attorney investigate the merits of the
. ~ ~ remedies do not include any
case before filing a ~ o m p l a i n t The
sort of punitive or liquidated damages to provide extra

82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (providing for fines and/or imprisonment of up to ten
years for retaliating against a person for providing a law enforcement officer with truthhl
information relating to commission of a federal crime).
83. See id. § 1514A(b). Sarbanes-Oxley assigned responsibility for whistleblower
investigations to the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor subsequently assigned
the responsibility to OSHA, which also conducts whistleblower investigations under thirteen
other federal statutes. See U.S. DEPARTMENTOF LABOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIVE
ASSISTANCE,THE WHISTLEBLOWERPROGRAM, www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/
index.htm1 (last visited Oct. 25,2006) (listing other statutes).
84. See Final Decision and Order Dismissing Appeal at 3 n.5, Allen v. Stewart Enter.,
No. 05-059 (ARB Case Aug. 17, 2005) (noting that complainants dismissed their appeal in
order to file in federal district court and stating that "[als is the usual case, the 180-day period
for deciding the case had expired before the Complainants filed their petition with the
Board"); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 88. The complete administrative process includes an initial
OSHA investigation, review by an Administrative Law Judge, and final review by the
Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.104, .107, ,110
(2005). Given the current caseload for OSHA, the initial investigation alone can take almost
180 days. The average time between the filing of a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint with OSHA and
the issuance of a report by the OSHA investigator was 127 days for Fiscal Year 2005. See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to Richard Moberly,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file
with author). This time period has grown significantly longer since the enactment of SarbanesOxley; in Fiscal Year 2003, the average length of a Sarbanes-Oxley investigation was ninetytwo days. See id.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
86. See id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).

encouragement for whistle blower^.^^ Finally, requiring employees to
jump through OSHA's administrative hoops before bringing a claim
in federal district court88 can be "cumbersome rather than
expeditious, biased rather than expert, [and] ineffective rather than
efficient."89
These statutory restrictions likely contribute to the low success
rates of employees who bring claims under Sarbanes-Oxley.
According to OSHA, of the 784 cases resolved at the initial
investigative level prior to September 30, 2006, OSHA investigators
found only 1 7 to have merit, while another 106 cases settled.90The
percentage of meritorious and settled cases for Sarbanes-Oxley is
slightly lower than the percentage of successful claimants for other
whistleblower statutes administered by
perhaps suggesting
that the "stronger" whistleblower protections of Sarbanes-Oxley do
not result in more protections for whistle blower^.^^ Moreover, of the
119 OSHA-level decisions that were appealed by April 28,2005, the
Department of Labor's Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) decided in
favor of employees only 4 times, while another 19 settled.93
The decisions issued by the ALJs further exacerbate SarbanesOxley's statutory shortcomings. Procedural issues eviscerate
claimants' cases. Several decisions dismissed complaints because the
wrong corporate entity was named94or because a corporation filed a
registration statement with the SEC but withdrew it before it

87. See id. § 1514A(c).
88. See id. $ 1514A(b); 29 C.F.R §§ 1980.101, ,103, ,104 (2005).
89. Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower
Protection, 51 ADMIN.L. REV. 581,621 (1999).
90. See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, t o Richard
Moberly, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (Oct. 3, 2006)
(on file with author).
91. See id. Interestingly, OSHA considers cases that have settled to be meritorious, and
thus includes settled cases in its "success" rate. See id.
92. Another contributing factor may be that employees are testing the outer boundaries
of this new statute in the early years after its enactment. It may be that the success rate
increases after ALJs, the ARB, and the courts answer basic questions regarding jurisdiction and
applicability.
93. See Email from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to Richard
Moberly, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (July 8,2005) (on
file with author).
94. See, ea., Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-11
(Dep't of Labor July 6, 2004) (dismissing complaint for failure to name both the publicly held
parent company and its subsidiary).
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became effective, thus denying coverage under the Act.95 Claims
have also been dismissed for missing the ninety-day statute of
limitations window? including claims that missed the deadline by
less than two weeks.97ALJs routinely reject equitable tolling of the
statute of limitation^.^^ ALJs dismissed other claims because
employees made whistleblower disclosures about topics not strictly
addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley, such as underpayment of employees,99
racial discrimination,loOor environmental vi~lations,'~'rather than
securities fraud.
These problems with Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision
reflect larger problems with the Anti-retaliation Model. First, antiretaliation provisions in general d o not provide realistic
encouragement for employees to become corporate monitors
because they focus on protection only after a disclosure is made.lo2
Surveys demonstrate that most employees are unaware of the
protections they may (or may not) receive should they report
wrongdoing.103 Moreover, even if an employee is aware that a
disclosure might be protected, it is exceedingly difficult to determine
the extent of any protection because there is little consistency among
whistleblower statutes.'" Whether a whistleblower is protected
95. See Roulett v. Am. Capital Access, No. 2004-SOX-00078 (Dep't of Labor Dec. 22,
2004).
96. See, eg., Lawrence v. AT&T Labs, No. 2004-SOX-00065 (Dep't of Labor Sept. 9,
2004); Kingoff v. Maxim Group L.L.C., No. 2004-SOX-00057 (Dep't of Labor July 21,
2004).
97. See Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-00054 (Dep't of Labor
Aug. 31, 2005); Hopkins v. ATK Tactical Sys., No. 2004-SOX-00019 (Dep't of Labor May
27,2004).
98. See Halpern, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-54, at 4; Harvey v. Home Depot, Inc., No.
2004-SOX-20, at 2 (Dep't of Labor June 2, 2006); Flood v. Cendent Corp., ALJ Case No.
2004-SOX-16.
99. See Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-35 (Dep't of Labor June 10,2004).
100. See Harvey, No. 2004-SOX-20.
101. See Hopkins, No. 2004-SOX-19.
102. See, eg., C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS:
BROKEN LIVES AND
ORGANIZATIONAL
POWER108-13 (2001); MICELI& NEAR, supra note 6, at 66, 153-56;
MIETHE,supra note 49, at 133; Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Aumalian,
U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'LL. 879, 908-09
(2004); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MMNC's, and Peace, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L
L. 457,474 (2002).
103. See MIETHE,supra note 49, at 54.
104. See 148 CONG.REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("[Clorporate employees who report fraud are subject to the patchwork and vagaries of
current state laws.").

depends upon the employee's state of residence, the industry in
which the employee works, the type of misconduct reported,'05 the
type of retaliation endured,lo6 and, under some statutes, the
willingness of administrative agencies to enforce the law.'07 SarbanesOxley only adds to this confusion because of its applicability to
specific types of employees making specific kinds of disclosures.
The second failure of the Anti-retaliation Model is that it does
not address the flow-of-information problems revealed by recent
scandals. Even if whistleblowing occurs and is protected, the Model
does not produce effective whistleblowing because anti-retaliation
laws rarely indicate to whom an employee should make a disclosure.
Therefore, although an employee may be protected from retaliation
if she reports corporate misconduct to a supervisor or corporate
executive, such information may never reach traditional corporate
monitors because of executive blocking and filtering. As discussed
above, in order for whistleblowers to act effectively as part of the
corporate monitoring system, employees must be able to report
misconduct to those with the authority and responsibility to end it
rather than to a supervisor who has less incentive to relay potentially
damaging information. The Anti-retaliation Model simply does not
address this issue.
Despite their shortcomings, anti-retaliation provisions provide
important protections to whistleblowers by ensuring that they are
not punished for engaging in socially beneficial conduct. Some
surveys report that well over half of whistleblowers experience some
sort of retaliation.lo8Other researchers place the actual number much

105. States vary widely in the type of protections they provide. Some, like Georgia, rigidly
adhere to the at-will employment doctrine. See Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that Georgia's employment-at-will statute permitted employer to
fire employee because employee was about to uncover criminal activities). Others, like New
Jersey, have a broad reaching statute protecting any whistleblower who reports any violation of
law. See N.J. STAT.ANN. § 34:19 (West 2005). Federal law protects only whistleblowers who
report certain types of violations in certain industries, and the extent of the protection varies
depending on the statute. See, e a . , STEPHENM. KOHN, CONCEPTSm~ PROCEDURESIN
WHISTLEBLOWERLAW
79-80 (2001); MICELI&NEAR, supra note 6, at 233-34.
106. Some laws protect employees only if they are discharged and d o not address other
forms of retaliation. See, e a . , White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (limiting
retaliation suits to cases in which an employee was actually or constructively discharged).
107. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 122 n.92 (noting statistics indicating OSHA was not
sufficiently enforcing the whistleblower provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
108. See, e.B., ALFORD,supra note 102, at 18 (citing studies in which one-half to twothirds of whistleblowers lose their jobs); Gerald V i t e n , Whistleblowing--Fact or Fiction: A n
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lower;109nonetheless, the results of retaliation can be devastating.
Whistleblowing employees have been found dead or beaten."' Some
whistleblowers lose their jobs and suffer emotional and financial
difficulties; studies show several losing their homes, filing for
bankruptcy, becoming divorced, and even attempting suicide."' In
short, the Anti-retaliation Model is necessary but insufficient to
address the flow-of-information problems uncovered in recent
scandals.

B. Inefiectiveness of Pre-scandal Versions of the Structural Model
In contrast to the Anti-retaliation Model, the Structural Model
focuses on encouraging and supporting whistleblowing before any
disclosure is made. The Structural Model is based on the
understanding that whistleblowing becomes easier and more
acceptable when corporations provide an authorized and visible
Introductory Discussion, in WHISTLEBLOWING-SUBVERSION
OR CORPORATECITIZENSHIP?,
supra note 7, at 3, 10-11 (citing study concluding that eighty-six of eighty-seven
whistleblowers experienced retaliation); Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 & n.35 (citing a nonscientific survey of two hundred whistleblowers by National Whistleblower Center finding that
over one-half had lost their jobs, and citing a survey by Government Accountability Project
that ninety percent of whistleblowers experienced retaliation or threats).
109. See MICELI& NEAR, supra note 6, at 203 (suggesting that generalizing about rate
of retaliation is difficult because of variables in studies and citing a study in which less than
twenty percent of whistleblowers were retaliated against); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet
Near, A Better Statutory Approach t o Whistleblowing, 7 BUS. ETHICSQ. 1, 6 (1997) (arguing
that studies show that most whistleblowers d o not suffer retaliation, even though most people
think they do).
110. Although it has been difficult to connect such events to the employee's
whistleblowing activities, examples of atrocities inflicted upon whistleblowers abound,
including the death of Karen Silkwood. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
(1984). More recently, an employee of Los Alamos National Laboratory was beaten shortly
before he was t o testify before Congress regarding alleged fraud at the lab. See Bradley Graham
& Griff W~tte,Whistle-Blower at LQS Alamos Attacked in Parking Lot in N.M., W A S HPOST,
.
June 7, 2005, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/06/06/AR2005060601787~pf.html. One of the primary whistleblowers in the
mutual h n d s scandal was also beaten. See O'Donnell, supra note 41.
111. See, ea., ALFORD,supra note 102, at 19-20; Vinten, supra note 108, at 11. Outside
of these extremes, retaliation may take many forms, including "harassment, threats of
termination, suspension, non-promotion, reassignment, transfer, denial of training,
withholding wages or other benefits, closer supervision and scrutiny, o r pestering." Ben
Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing 26 (George Mason Law & Econ. Res., Paper No.
04-56, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/absuact=622723;
see aLro ALFORD, supra note
102, at 31; Baynes, supra note 8, at 895. Even former employees may face blacklisting from
certain industries o r from the job market in general. See, ea., Brickey, supra note 33, at 36465; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 326; Depoorter & De Mot, supra, at 26 & n.106.
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channel for employees to report misconduct.112Unlike the Antiretaliation Model, which, to be utilized at all, assumes an adversarial
relationship between the employee whistleblower and the employer,
the Structural Model encourages employees to become part of the
corporate monitoring system, allowing them to work in concert with
the corporation rather than against it. The Structural Model
encourages employees to report misconduct by highlighting the
extrinsic social and employment benefits of monitoring ethical and
regulatory standards while cooperating with the c~rporation."~
Instead of impractically relying on management hierarchies to relay
reports of misconduct to external regulators, the Structural Model
provides a visible mechanism for employee reports to reach the ears
of those who can remedy the misconduct.
Despite its potential benefits, versions of the Structural Model in
place in both the public and private sectors prior to recent corporate
scandals were ineffective. In the public sphere, the federal
government created a structure for whistleblowing employees to
report misconduct in both the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IGA)
and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CsRA).ll4 Under these
statutes, Congress created offices specifically charged with receiving
and investigating federal employee claims of wrongdoing in the
g~vernment."~
The IGA required most federal agencies to create a
position of Inspector General, which received complaints from that
agency's employee^."^ The CSRA was broader in its approach and
provided an outlet for reports from any federal employee through
the Ofice of Special Counsel (OSC).'17

112. Social science research demonstrates that whistleblowing increases when there is an
identifiable, specific means for whistleblowing to occur. See, ea., Janet P . Near & Terry M.
Dworkin, Responses to Lgisfative Changes: Corporate WhistleblowingPolicies, 1 7 J . Bus. ETHICS
1551,1557 (1998).
113. See discussion infra Part N.
114. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. $$ 1-12 (2000); Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of title 5 of the United States Code). Both statutes also incorporated the Antiretaliation Model by protecting federal employees who report any violations of law, rule, or
regulation, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety. See, ea., 5 U.S.C. app. $ 7 ; id. $ 2302(b)(8).
115. See id. app. $ 2; id. $ 1206(b), repealed by Pub. L. 101-12 $ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16
(1989).
116. See id. app. $ 2
117. See id. $1206(b)(3), repealed by Pub. L. 101-12, $ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
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The beginnings of the Structural Model are best seen in the
OSC. The OSC receives whistleblower disclosures and informs the
necessary federal agency about potential misconduct occurring
within its ranks.l18 By informing agencies of potential problems,
Congress hoped that the OSC would become an "'early warning
system' of budding problems, serious enough to place agency
leadership on notice and to require ackn~wledgement.""~If the
OSC believes that a whistleblower's disclosure reveals a "substantial
likelihood" of wrongdoing within a government agency, the OSC
can require that agency to conduct an investigation and submit a
report covering its findings.120 The OSC evaluates the report and
determines whether the agency's findings are reasonable and contain
the appropriate information required by statute.121 Ultimately, the
OSC submits the agency reports to Congress and the President and
keeps a public file of the report.122Thus, the CSRA (and the IGA
under similar provisions) go hrther than simply protecting
whistleblowing employees from retaliation, although they
theoretically do that as well. Congress intended for these statutes to
encourage whistleblowing by providing public-sector employees with
an easy channel to report r n i s c ~ n d u c t . ' ~ ~
Prior to recent corporate scandals, whistleblower disclosure
channels were not imposed upon corporations in the private sector.
Rather, Congress and various courts gave organizations incentives to
create internal compliance systems, which often would include

118. See id. $ 1206(b)(2); see also Thomas M . Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Abuse of
Authorityr The W c e of the Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 5, 52
(1986).
119. Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 19-20 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. H11822
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Rep. Schroeder)).
120. See 5 U.S.C. $ 1206(b)(3)(A), repealed by Pub. L. 101-12, $3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16
(1989).
121. See id. In cases in which the OSC believed that the employee's information about
misconduct was reasonably supported, the agency's report had to include a variety of
information, including a summary of the investigation, a listing of any violation of law, ~ l eor,
regulation, and a description of any corrective action taken as a result of the investigation. See
id. $ 1206(b).
122. Id. $ 1206(b)(5)(A).If the agency failed to submit a timely report, the OSC was to
notify Congress and the President of that failure as well. See id.
123. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 2 0 ("The purpose of the OSC
whistleblowing disclosure channel was 'to encourage employees to give the government the
first crack at cleaning its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force correction.'"
(footnote omitted)).

implementing disclosure channels for employees to report corporate
misconduct.
In 1991, Congress approved the federal Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines (OSG), which utilized a "carrot and stick"
approach12*to encourage organizations to implement an "effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law."125Under the OSG,
penalties for corporations convicted of crimes could be reduced by
up to ninety-five percent if the corporation previously implemented
such a program. Conversely, if no such program existed, then the
potential fines could be multiplied by up to four hundred percent.'26
An "effective program" required that the organization exercise due
diligence in preventing and detecting criminal conduct within the
organization.'27 Such due diligence, in turn, required "having in
place and publicizing a reporting system whereby employees and
other agents could report criminal conduct by others within the
organization without fear of r e t r i b ~ t i o n . " ' ~ ~
The judiciary also gave incentives to corporations to monitor
l~~
themselves more closely through structural disclosure ~ h a n n e 1 s . In
an influential opinion, Delaware's Chancery Court opined that a
director of a corporation has a duty to be reasonably informed about
the corporation, a duty which includes implementing an adequate
"corporate information and reporting system."'30 This holding
124. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and
Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and
Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 190-91 (2002); Dworkin, supra note 102, at
464; Near & Dworkin, supra note 112, at 1557; Win Swenson, The Organizational
Grridelines' "Carrot and Stick" Philosophy, and Their Focus on cEfective" Compliance, in GOOD
CITIZEN,supra note 3, at 27,29.
125. U.S. SE~TENCING
GUIDELINES
MANUAL§ 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k) (1991)
[hereinafter OSG]. The OSG were amended after the corporate scandals in November 2004.
See UNITED STATES SENTENCINGCOMMISSION,ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES
AND
COMPLIANCE,
http://www.ussc.gov/orgguide.htm
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (providing
manual of federal sentencing guidelines and policy statements effective Nov. 1,2004).
126. See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New
FORESTL. REV. 565,567 (2004).
Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE
127. OSG, supra note 125, § 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k).
128. Id. $ 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5).
129. See Callahan et al., supra note 124, at 190; Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM.L. REV. 458, 480-84
(2001).
130. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). Failure to set up such a
corporate reporting structure may expose the director to breach of fiduciary charges if the lack
of such a system caused a loss. Id.
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encourages directors to initiate and maintain a disclosure channel for
employees and encourages agents to inform directors about
problems within the corporation because a breach of this duty could
result in director liability.131 In the sexual harassment context, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that employers who make reasonable
efforts to deter and correct illegally harassing behavior may have an
affirmative defense available to them against a sexual harassment
plaintiff who has not been subject to a tangible employment
action.'32 The Court has further held that if a corporation has an
internal mechanism available to report wrongdoing, then it may be
able to avoid punitive damages in a later w r o n m l discharge case
These judicial holdings encourage
brought by a whi~tleblower.'~~
corporations to establish whistleblower disclosure channels because
they mitigate corporate liability for misconduct, along with its
attendant litigation costs, if sufficient processes are in ~ 1 a c e . l ~ ~
Yet, these pre-scandal versions of the Structural Model, like the
Anti-retaliation Model, failed to encourage effective whistleblowing.
One problem was that whistleblower disclosure systems often did
not provide a legitimate outlet for employees to report misconduct
because the channels resulted in disclosure to a non-responsive or
biased party. For example, the OSG d o not speci@ to whom
whistleblower disclosures must be r e ~ 0 r t e d . lThus,
~ ~ in order to
satisfy the OSG, corporations implemented disclosure channels that
flowed up through the corporate management hierarchy,136placing
employee disclosures at risk of management blocking and filtering.
The CSRA exemplifies the related problem of reporting to a
biased party. The CSRA's whistleblowing channel did not work, in
large part because of the anti-employee bias of a series of Special
Counsels that summarily failed to order investigations of employee

131. See Dworkin, supra note 102, at 466.
132. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807 (1998).
133. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 5 4 5 4 6 (1999); see also Callahan et
al., supra note 124, at 194.
134. See Callahan et al., supra note 124, at 192-93; Sturm, supra note 129, at 557.
135. See OSG, supra note 125, s8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5).
136. See Andrew R Apel, A National Study of Compliance Practices, in GOODCITIZEN,
supra note 3, at 127, 127-30; Edward S. Peuy, A Study of Compliance Practices in
aCompliance Aware" Companies, in GOODCITIZEN,
supra note 3, at 1 3 9 , 1 3 9 4 2 .

corn plaint^.'^^ Although the first two Special Counsels ordered
agency investigations for approximately 25 percent of employee
complaints, beginning in 1983, a new Special Counsel drastically
reduced the number of investigations ordered to approximately 7.5
percent of the complaints.138 In other words, whistleblower
disclosures were being made, but the OSC rarely required agencies
to confront the problems being raised. Ultimately, the CSRA was
amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, but the
unchallenged discretion of the Special Counsel to order
investigations remains,139leaving in doubt the ability of government
employees to report wrongdoing effectively.14'
137. Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 52. The discretion was magnified because "no
standards of accountability were established for the OSC, the opportunity for judicial review
was minimal, and no private right of action was created by the Act." Terry Morehead Dworkin
& Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:Protecting the Znterestr of the Employee, the
Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267,282 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
138. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 53.
139. The WPA made several changes t o the whistleblower disclosure channel provisions
of the CSRA. For example, the WPA now permits a whistleblower to comment upon an
agency's report after it is submitted to the OSC. See 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e)(l) (1994). This is an
important provision because "the whistleblower is often in a good position to evaluate whether
the agency's response represents a good faith investigation." Thomas M. Devine, The
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundationfor the Modem Law of Employment Dissent, 5 1
ADMIN. L. REV. 53?, 562 n.174 (1999) (quoting H.R Rep. No. 100-274, at 25 (1987)).
Further, the WPA reduces the risk to whistleblowers themselves by making it more difficult for
the OSC to reveal a whistleblower's identity. Under the CSRA, the OSC could reveal a
whistleblower's identity "in order to carry out the functions of the Special Counsel." See 5
U.S.C. § 1206(b)(1)(1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-12, $ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
Under the WPA, the OSC may only identify a whistleblower without his or her consent if
exposure "is necessary because of an imminent danger to public health or safety or imminent
violation of any criminal law." 5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (1994); see also Devine, supra, at 563-64
(describing this provision). Importantly, however, the OSC will not accept anonymous
disclosures and will only protect the confidentiality of the whistleblower to the extent
permitted by § 1213(h). See U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Whistleblower Disclosures (May 4,
2005), http://www.osc.gov/wbdisc.htm. Of course, this process requires a fair amount of
trust in the OSC by a federal whistleblowing employee.
Despite these changes, the WPA's focus was on the Anti-retaliation Model, not the
Structural Model. This failure to give sufficient attention to the whistleblower disclosure
channels led one commentator to argue that the WPA "bypassed the process of maximizing
constructive potential from dissent, a curious omission since one of the WPA's objectives is to
spark increased challenges of bureaucratic misconduct." Devine, supra, at 561.
140. The most recent Annual Report from the OSC suggests that the OSC's disclosure
channel still does not operate consistently to provide a whistleblower's information to his or
her agency head. From 2002 through 2004, only about 2.9% of employee disclosures were
referred to agency heads for investigation. See U.S. OFFICEOF SPECIALCOUNSELFISCALYEAR
2004 ANNUALREPORT15 (2005), available at http://www.osc.gov/library.htm#annual. The
exact percentage is difficult to obtain from the annual reports submitted by the OSC. During
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Another problem with the pre-scandal Structural Model was that
companies had little legal incentive to implement effective
whistleblower disclosure channels because courts and prosecutors
rarely penalized bad systems or rewarded good ones.141 Specifically,
corporations could easily create supeficial structures that satisfied
the OSG but were ineffective. These structures were often little more
than "window-dressing," which did little to encourage actual
whistleb10wing.l~~Indeed, the recent corporate scandals occurred
with little outcry from corporate employees despite every appearance
at the scandal-ridden corporations that sufficient mechanisms were in
place to encourage detection and reporting of fraud. For example,
Enron appeared to satisfy the OSG standards for a compliance
program even though the program was not effective in reality.'43
Moreover, not only were superficial systems easy to create, but also
the government provided few valuable incentives for companies to
implement effective reporting mechanisms. Despite the OSG's
penalty reduction incentive, the OSG's requirement that
corporations implement "effective compliance systems" rarely helped
a corporation facing criminal liability. From 1992 to 2005, only
three organizations received a penalty reduction under the OSG for
having an effective system.144
fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the OSC closed 1841 disclosure matters. Id. During those
same three years, it referred only forty-eight matters to agency heads. Id. The closed matter
numbers do not exactly correspond to agency referrals because there may be some overlap
from year to year. However, these raw numbers present a stark picture of the continued failure
of the OSC to serve as the disclosure clearinghouse envisioned by the CSRA and the WPA.
141. The market could have provided incentives for corporations to implement effective
whistleblowing disclosure systems. However, several barriers prevent the market from working
efficiently in this area. These barriers are addressed infia in Part V.A.
142. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls To Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J . COW. L.
267,314 (2003-2004).
143. See Fiorelli, supra note 126, at 567 & n.lO; see also Charles M . Elson & Christopher
J. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKEFORESTL.
REV. 691, 702 (2004) (noting that Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Adelphia each had
compliance systems, "none of which, obviously, was very effectiven).
144. See Frank 0 . Bowman 111, Driftin. Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some
Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing,
39 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 671, 684 (2004) (providing information from 1992-2002); see also
u.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERALSENTENCING
STATISTICStbl.
54 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2OO5/SBTOC05.htm;
U.S.
SENTENCINGCOMM'N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERALSENTENCING
STATISTICStb1.54
(2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/SBTOC04.htm;
U.S.

Thus, prior to recent corporate scandals, enforcement and
follow-through weaknesses in the Structural Model prevented
effective employee whistleblowing. In the private sector, disclosures
were directed to corporate executives rather than traditional
corporate monitors, which restricted information flow. An
organization might have an excellent disclosure structure in place,
but would simply refuse to support it by actually responding to
whistleblower disclosures. Ineffective and unsupported disclosure
channels failed to encourage employees to become whistleblowers
and, if employees did blow the whistle, their disclosures rarely
reached parties willing and able to address them.
C. Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model
Sarbanes-Oxley implements a new and improved version of the
Structural Model. Under Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit
committee of the board of directors of public companies must
establish procedures for receiving complaints regarding accounting,
internal accounting controls, or auditing matters.'45 Additionally, the
audit committee must be able to receive anonymous disclosures by
employees regarding accounting or auditing matters.146 These
requirements significantly alter the pre-scandal Structural Model in
two ways.
First, Sarbanes-Oxley improves the legitimacy of the disclosure
channel. It requires that independent directors on the board's audit
committee receive whistleblower disclosures. This direct line to a
traditional corporate monitor with the authority and responsibility to
address whistleblower concerns enables whistleblowers to avoid the
blocking and filtering from corporate executives. As recognized by
the SEC when it amended its general rules and regulations by
implementing Section 301,147directors typically rely upon company
managers to provide information, but managers "may not have the

SENTENCING
COMM'N,2003 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING
STATISTICS
tbl. 54
(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2OO3/SBTOC03. htm.
145. 15 U.S.C. $78j-l(m)(4)(A)(Supp. 2002).
146. Id. $ 78j-l(m)(4)(B).
147. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees Nos. 33-8220 & 3447654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Release] (promulgating 17
C.F.R $ 240.10A-3, including subsection (b)(3) related to procedures for complaints).
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appropriate incentives to self-report all questionable practices.7,148
Accordingly, the SEC rightfully asserted that "[tlhe establishment of
formal procedures for receiving and handling complaints should
serve to facilitate disclosures, encourage proper individual conduct
and alert the audit committee to potential problems before they have
serious consequences."149 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley provides for
anonymous disclo~ures,'~~
which should improve the willingness of
employees to come forward with information. Requiring a legitimate
disclosure channel will unleash the true potential of the Structural
Model and reveal its power to overcome the information problems
that undermined employee effectiveness as corporate monitors
during the corporate scandals. The Model's ability to improve
information flow is discussed in the next Part.
Second, for the first time in the private sector, the Structural
Model is broadly imposed rather than merely encouraged.151The Act
instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission to direct the
national securities exchanges and national securities associations
(e.g., the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of
Securities Dealers) to prohibit the listing of any security of a
company that is not in compliance with this r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ' The
~~
penalty for noncompliance with Section 301 and the corresponding
listing rules is delisting, which can harm corporations and their
shareholders significantly.'53
148. Id. at 18,798. In light of the tremendous malfeasance by managers during recent
corporate scandals, this seems like somewhat of an understatement.
149. Id.
150. See 15 U.S.C. 5 78j-l(m)(4)(B).
151. The Structural Model also has been imposed in specific instances through consent
decrees and other settlements by government agencies. For example, in a consent decree with
the SEC, Qwest Communications agreed t o install a chief compliance officer, with reporting
obligations to a committee of outside directors, who is responsible for responding to employee
reports about misconduct. See SEC Charges Qwest Communications International Inc. with
Multi-faceted Accounting and Financial Reporting Fraud, SEC Litig. Release No. 18936 (Oct.
21,2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8936.htm
(cited in Marc
I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure when the Whistle
Blms in the Post Sarbnnes-Oxley Era, 30 J . CORP. L. 445, 456 11.90 (2005)). With regard t o
discrimination complaints, courts also have been active in approving corporate structural
reform to address accusations of systematic bias within individual corporations. See Sturm,
supra note 129, at 509-19, 557 (describing system mandated by consent decree involving
Home Depot).
152. 15 U.S.C. $78j-l(m)(l)(A).
153. See E-mail from Stanley Keller, Chair of Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, Section of Business Law, Am. Bar Ass'n (Feb. 25, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/

Although Sarbanes-Oxley mandated the implementation of the
Structural Model, Congress did not dictate specific requirements for
such a reporting system. Moreover, the SEC did not require specific
procedures when it promulgated rules implementing SarbanesOxley's mandate-despite
the fact that commentators who
responded to the proposed rule "were split" over how specific the
SEC should be.154The majority of commentators argued that the
rules should give audit committees the flexibility to develop
individualized procedures to receive complaints because of the
diversity of companies affected by the rule.'55 The SEC based this
minimalist regulatory approach on the diverse needs of a variety of
corporations, arguing that corporations themselves
should be provided with flexibility t o develop and utilize
procedures appropriate for their circumstances. The procedures
that will be most effective to meet the requirements for a very small
listed issuer with few employees could be very chfferent from the
processes and systems that would need t o be in place for large,
multi-national corporations with thousands of employees in many
different jurisdiction^.'^^

Following the SEC's lead, both the New York Stock Exchange and
the NASDAQ merely required that their listed companies have audit
committees that complied with the SEC's rule.157
Sarbanes-Oxley thus responds to the failings of the pre-scandal
Structural Model in two ways. First, the Act implements a
whistleblower disclosure channel that provides information directly
to independent corporate directors. As described in the next Part,
this change directly addresses the flow-of-information problems
demonstrated by the corporate scandals. Second, Sarbanes-Oxley
mandates the implementation of a disclosure channel in every public
corporation. Although this mandatory implementation is an
improvement, I suggest in Part V of this Article that Sarbanes~les/proposed/s70203/skellerl.htm ("Delisting is a remedy with significant adverse
consequences both to the issuer and its shareholders. Realistically, the failure to conform to a
corporate governance listing standard in one primary market will leave no alternative
comparable trading opportunity available for the company.").
154. See SEC Release, sztpra note 147, at 18,798.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See NASD Rules § 4350(d)(3) (2005); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual
5 303A (2004).
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Oxley's minimalist approach fails to address key potential problems
with the Model.

IV. THEPOWEROF SARBANES-OXLEY'S
STRUCTURAL
MODEL
As utilized by Sarbanes-Oxley, the Structural Model should
encourage more effective whistleblowing than either the Antiretaliation Model or previous versions of the Structural Model.
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model overcomes the flow-ofinformation problems exposed by the recent scandals by
implementing a legitimate whistleblower disclosure channel.
Through its legitimacy, the channel encourages employees to
become active corporate monitors and to disclose corporate
misconduct. Equally important, this channel facilitates the
movement of such information from the employees (those with the
most information) to the traditional corporate monitors (those with
the power and responsibility to utilize the information effectively).
Thus, the Structural Model's power lies in its ability to increase both
the amount and the effectiveness of disclosures from whistleblowing
employees.
A. More Disclosures

Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model should increase the amount
of whistleblowing because it provides incentives for employees to
become whistleblowers and reduces several of the most significant
disincentives. By contrast, the Anti-retaliation Model provides little,
if any, incentive to blow the whistle and addresses, somewhat poorly,
only one disincentive-the fear of retaliation.
Studies demonstrate that designating a uniform recipient of
whistleblower complaints in an organization and directing employees
to that recipient results in increased amounts of whi~tleblowing.'~~
Perhaps one reason for the increase is that employees become
whistleblowers out of a sense of loyalty to their 0 r g a n i ~ a t i o n . l ~ ~
158. See Karen L. Hooks et al., Enhancing Communication To h i s t in Fraud Prevetztion
and Detection, 13 AUDITING:
J . PRAC.&THEORY
86,92-93 (1994).
159. As Professor Cass Sunstein has noted with regard to people who dissent publicly:
There is an ironic point here . . . . Conformists are often thought to be protective of
social interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group. By contrast, dissenters tend
to be seen as selfish individualists, embarking on projects o f their own. But in an
important sense, the opposite is closer to the truth. Much of the time, dissenters
benefit others, while conformists benefit themselves.
~

-
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Contrary to popular belief regarding the traitorous nature of such
"snitches," social science research demonstrates that whistleblowers
often are employees with long tenure who believe they will serve the
organization's best interests by providing information about
organizational wrongdoing.160 The whistleblowers involved in the
recent corporate scandals seem to satisfy this documented
generalization. Both Sherron Watkins of Enron and Cynthia Cooper
of WorldCom profess that they were driven by their sense of loyalty
to their organizations and that they were disappointed in the
corporate misconduct that ultimately destroyed their corporation^.'^^
An internal disclosure channel provides a way for employees to
demonstrate their loyalty by disclosing misconduct without having to
report colleagues to "outside" authorities.
A disclosure channel also harmonizes with a whistleblower's
tendency to report misconduct internally16'-a tendency likely driven
by this sense of loyalty. Sherron Watkins reported her misgivings to
Ken Lay, but she did not make a public report until she was called to
testify before a House committee investigating Enron's bankruptcy.
Cynthia Cooper reported her findings first to WorldCom7s CFO and
then to the company's Board of Directors. A similar pattern emerged
in the scandals at Xerox, Global Crossing, Duke Power, and in the
mutual fund scandal, whereby an employee attempted to resolve a
problem internally so that the company could fix it and remain in

160. See, ea., ALFORD,supra note 102, at 79-80; MICELI&NEAR,supra note 6, at 16970; David Culp, Whinleblowcrs: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial Perspective,
13 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP.L.J. 109, 115 (1995-1996); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137,
at 300-01.
161. See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 36, at 32 (asserting that Watkis and Cooper,
along with Coleen Rowley of the FBI, are the "truest of true believers . . . ever faithhl to the
idea that where they worked was a place that served the wider world in some important wayn);
Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, TIME,Dec. 30, 2002, at 53 (describing
Watkins's reaction); Ripley, supra note 36, at 4 7 4 9 (describing Cooper's reaction to discovery
of WorldCom's fraud).
162. See, e.g., MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE
WHISTLEBLOWERS:
EXPOSINGCORRUPTION
IN GOVERNMENT
AND INDUSTRY 195 (1989);
KAREN L. SOEKEN& DONALD R SOEKEN,A SURVEYOF WHISTLEBLOWEM:
THEIR
STRESSORS
AND COPINGSTRATEGIES 160 (1987); Callahan et d., supra note 124, at 195;
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 300-01; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 33537; Gregory R Watchman, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers: A New Corporate Early Warning
System, at 8, http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/GAP%2OAnalysis%2OSarbanes%2DOxley"h
2Epdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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business.163This type of situation fits well with the psyche of the
American employee, whose sense of loyalty to the organization keeps
her from reporting misconduct externally, but who may report
internally if encouraged by the 0 r g a n i ~ a t i o n . l ~ ~
In addition to providing incentives by encouraging loyalty, the
Structural Model should reduce the most visible disincentives to
whistleblowing behavior. For example, the Model should reduce the
amount of retaliation against whistleblowers because the Model
focuses on the recipient of a whistleblower's complaint rather than
on the whistleblower. Studies demonstrate that the recipient of
complaints plays a large role in determining both the outcome of
each complaint and whether subsequent whistleblowers will feel free
to come
By requiring that the top echelon of a
corporation receive complaints, whistleblowers are more likely to
have support from upper levels of the corporation. This "top-down"
support should reduce the amount of retaliation felt by employees
~ ~ structure
and, therefore, encourage more w h i s t l e b l o ~ i n g . 'This
further allows whistleblowers to avoid conflicted supervisors or highranking managers who are likely to feel defensive about wrongdoing
occurring in their deparunent.16' Additionally, because SarbanesOxley permits employees to report wrongdoing anonymously or
confidentially, employees' fear of retaliation should be m i n i m i ~ e d . ' ~ ~

163. See PARTNOY,supra note 51, at 362-63 (explaining the Global Crossing scandal);
Davis, supra note 42 (explaining the Duke Power scandal); O'Donnell, supra note 41
(explaining more about the mutual fund scandal); see also Christine Dugas, Whistle-Bluwer Tells
Stov of Mutual Fund Scandal, USA TODAY, May 26, 2005, available a t
http://www.yourlawyer.com/articles/read/7377
(explaining the mutual h n d scandal);
Whistleblowing: Peep and Weep, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2002, available a t
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/3002918?f=options
(explaining the Xerox
scandal). This tendency is clear in Watkins's letter to Ken Lay, in which she attempted to
present solutions for Enron to "fix" the accounting improprieties she discovered. See Letter
from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay (on file with author).
164. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 1242 (asserting that encouraging external
whistleblowing may be ineffective because it is so ingrained in corporate mentality to be loyal
and to withhold adverse information).
165. See MICELI& NEAR, supra note 6,at 77.
166. Marcia P. Miceli et al., Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers?Results of a Naturally
Occurring Field Experiment, 26 WORK& OCCUPATIONS129,134,143-44(1999).
167. See MICELI&NEAR, supra note 6,at 184.
168. Not surprisingly, studies consistently demonstrate that individuals are more willing
to state a dissenting viewpoint if they can do so anonymously. See MIETHE,supra note 49,at
54-57;SUNSTEIN,supra note 159, at 20. Permitting such anonymous reporting does have
downsides: often such reports are not as trustworthy and there is little opportunity for feedback

Thus, the Structural Model implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley most
likely reduces the significant deterrent of retaliation in a different,
and perhaps more effective, manner than the Anti-retaliation
~ode1.l~~
The Structural Model also increases employees' confidence that
their complaints will yield positive results. Studies of whistleblowers
demonstrate that an even larger concern than retaliation is the fear
that nothing will be done in response to a whistleblowing
complaint.170This concern was justified during the latest corporate
scandals, as employees in scandal-ridden companies routinely
watched those who broke the law receive promotions and raises.17'
Understandably, employees are usually unwilling to take the
tremendous career and social risks associated with whistleblowing if
their report has little potential to change the status quo. While the
Anti-retaliation Model does little to reduce this disincentive, the
Structural Model addresses it by requiring that disclosures go directly
to the company's directors, who all have a fiduciary duty to address
m i s c ~ n d u c t . ' ~Rather
~
than simply providing information to a
manager and hoping someone with actual authority receives it,
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model guarantees that the appropriate
corporate leaders will consider a whistleblower's disclosure.
Corporate and societal pressures that encourage silence are
additional disincentives to whistleblowing. Some corporations push
employees-in the name of organizational loyalty-to go along with
illegal corporate actions and to refrain from betraying the company

or follow-up. However, to the extent the Anti-retaliation Model is not working effectively,
anonymous reporting may encourage those who are othenvise reluctant to speak out for fear of
retribution.
169. The Structural Model also reinforces the Anti-retaliation Model. As a practical
matter, retaliating against a whistleblowing employee will be significantly more difficult if the
employee utilizes an internal reporting structure. The employee's disclosure will be
documented and any subsequent employment action against the employee most likely will
trigger extra review by the corporation.
170. See Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37 (citing survey responses t o assert
that a primary reason employees do not'blow the whistle is because the employee believes that
nothing will be done to correct the activity); see also MICELI& NEAR,supra note 6, at 65-66;
Dworlun & Callahan, supra note 137, at 302; Hooks et al., supra note 158, at 93.
171. See MCLEAN& ELKIND,supra note 3, at 139, 153-54, 187 (describing promotions
and raises for Andrew Fastow, Ken Rice, and Ben GIisan at Enron).
172. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
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through d i s c l o s ~ r e . 'Additionally,
~~
society discourages individuals
from becoming "squealers" and betraying loyalties.'74 Arguably, it
simply may be human nature to conform to group norms and to gain
acceptance from our peers,17' as evidenced by the broad employee
silence during recent corporate scandals.
The Structural Model's moderate approach is well suited to
combat corporate pressure on employees. Such pressure to be silent
in the face of wrongdoing is particularly problematic because of its
prevalence, which may cause judges and other decision-makers to
hesitate before imposing stiff criminal and civil sanctions upon
managers who use retaliation to enforce employee conformity and
~ i 1 e n c e . lModerate
~~
measures are more likely to achieve positive
results. T o paraphrase Dan Kahan's theory regarding sticky norms in
general, sometimes a "gentle nudge" like the Structural Model may
be more effective in altering sticky norms, such as employee silence,
than "hard shoves" like the Anti-retaliation M0de1.l~~In other
words, the Structural Model provides a more moderate reform that is
less likely to alienate persons who encourage whistleblowing. This
more temperate approach may subtly alter corporate norms of
secrecy and retaliation to make open communication more viable.
Implementing a whistleblower disclosure channel will signal to
employees that the management and ownership of the firm are
committed to corporate ethics.17*Although Sarbanes-Oxley does not
173. For example, a whistleblower at Fannie Mae recently stated that other employees
did not report wrongdoing at the company because of Fannie Mae's corporate environment,
which he described as "one of intimidation, restraint of dissenting opinions, and pressure to be
part of the 'Team,' giving [corporate officers] the numbers [they] desired to please the
markets." See Peter Eavis, Fannie's Hedging Deals Look Thorny, Oct. 15, 2004,
http://ww.thestreet.com/comment/detox/l0187363.html.
174. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 123 (citing MICELI &NEAR,
supra note 6, at 132-35,.
175-78); Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37.
175. See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 159, at 9; Cunningham, supra note 142, at 317; John M.
Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagiozrs Ovganizational Corruption, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1177,1189-92 (2005).
176. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
6 7 U . CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (describing the "sticky norms problem" whereby "the
prevalence of a social norm makes decision makers reluctant to carry out a law intended to
change that norm").
177. Id. at 608; see also Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Ineficient Norms, 144 U .
PA. L. REV. 1697,1730-31 (1996).
178. See SUNSTEIN,supra note 159, at 30 (advocating the importance of creating a
culture that "welcomes disagreement and that does not punish those who depart from the
prevailing orthodoxy," and suggesting that creating "channels by which dissent can be

enforce employee use of the ~hannel,"~
the mere existence of a viable
channel may demonstrate to employees that reporting misconduct is
appropriate and expected.'80
The Sarbanes-Oxley Model also indirectly encourages
whistleblowing by requiring that disclosures go directly to the board
of directors-a structure that signals the importance of employee
monitoring and reporting.18' As a result, the actual behavior of
directors and managers may change because their employees have a
more formal role in preventing corporate fraud.'82 These corporate
officers may therefore become more committed to the norm of open
communication.183Employees, in turn, will take their cue not only
from the existence of the structural disclosure channel, but also from
the acceptance of the channel by their managers and supervisors.184
This changing social attitude can cascade and expand until a more
pervasive norm develops, one in which employees understand that
reporting misconduct is expected and encouraged because
disclosures ultimately benefit the c ~ r p o r a t i o n . ' ~ ~
expressed anonymously" might encourage such a culture); Brett H. McDonnell, Sox Appeals,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 530 (asserting that "norms of good behavior [can be] as . . .
important [a] limit on managerial misbehavior" as other disciplinary mechanisms).
179. Enforcement is geared toward requiring the existence of the channel, not toward
regulating its use. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 1 5 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(l)(A)(Supp.
2002); 1 7 C.F.R § 240.16a-3(a) (2000).
180. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of l a w , 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2032 (1996) (arguing that even an under-enforced law may serve an expressive function that
can alter behavior in "signaling appropriate behavior and in inculcating the expectation of
social opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the announced norm").
181 . See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 104 ("If the firm's commitment to
certain behaviors can be communicated successfully, this should be a strong pull. And if other
agents publicly signal their adherence t o the policy, conformity pressures will go t o work as
well. A positive compliance culture will evolve."); cf: Estlund, supra note 77, at 375 (noting
that Sarbanes-Oxley plays an important role "by protecting and institutionalizing employee
whistleblowing").
182. Cf Kostant, supra note 69, at 556-58 (arguing that corporate lawyers may become
better corporate watchdogs because of their more formalized role under Sarbanes-Oxley).
Professor Kostant's arguments that Sarbanes-Oxley may change the social norms for attorneys
support the argument that a formalized structure for reporting misconduct may alter the social
norm against whistleblowing that exists in many corporations. See id.
183. See Kahan, supra note 176, at 635-36.
184. See id.
185. See Sunstein, supra note 180, at 2033 (discussing the development of "norm
cascades, as reputational incentives [that] shift behavior in new directionsn) (citing TIMUR
KURAN, PRIVATETRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCESOF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION
3 (1995)).
-
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Accordingly, under the Structural Model, not reporting may
actually be seen as disloyal, and those who stand mute in the face of
wrongdoing may be considered defectors from the norm, subject to
social sanctions, such as ostracism, or even employment sanctions,
~ ~ example,
such as discipline for not reporting r n i s c o n d ~ c t . 'For
when WorldCom emerged from bankruptcy as MCI, the company
conducted an intensive internal investigation and fired fifty
employees, many of whom were not involved in the fraud but who
likely knew about it.lg7 Structural encouragements can become selfhlfilling as they are given legitimacy by legal and human resource
professionals within the corporation.lg8 As Professor Peter Kostant
has argued, "a slight adjustment, or clarification of social meaning,
can powerfdly affect norms of behavior."1g9
This theoretical approach to social norms finds support in
research regarding influences on whistleblowing behavior. Studies
demonstrate that internal whistleblowing increases when ethical and
legal compliance policies exist in an organization,lgOparticularly if
specific whistleblowing procedures are in place.lgl Such reporting
procedures give whistleblowers more power by officially providing
~
two of the most
encouragement and ~ r 0 t e c t i o n . l ~Indeed,
prominent social science researchers of whistleblowing behavior
contend that the best approach for encouraging whistleblowing is to
"set up internal complaint procedures where concerned employees
could report, and make sure that those procedures provide for
speedy and impartial review."lg3
Thus, whistleblowing will likely increase if the attitudes of
corporate players and the corporation's social norms encourage it.lg4
It is commonly argued that in order to encourage whistleblowers,
corporations need to develop a more ethical and open culture,
-

-

-

--

-

-

186. See id. at 2029-30.
187. See McCafferty, supra note 74.
188. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J . SOC. 1401, 1406-17 (1990).
189. Kostant, supra note 69, at 553.
190. See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1198-1201.
191. See MICELI
& NEAR, supra note 6 , at 150.
192. See id. at 223.
193. Id. at 249; see also Dworkin, supra note 102, at 474.
194. See MICELI& NEAR, supra note 6, at 158-60; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9,
at 326.
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implemented from the top of the organizational hierarchy.'95 Yet,
beyond relying upon enlightened corporate leaders, specific
recommendations regarding how society can implement such a
corporate culture are rare because it is difficult-if not impossiblefor the government to mandate a culture of honesty. SarbanesOxley's Structural Model might provide a means to encourage the
development of such an ethical corporate culture by mandating both
a process for whistleblowers to follow and a high-level recipient for
whistleblower disclosures.
There are obvious limitations to the ability of the Structural
Model to turn employees into corporate monitors. Like any
corporate monitor, employees suffer from cognitive biases that may
inhibit them from spotting and reporting wrongdoing. For example,
in the face of ambiguous evidence of wrongdoing, employees tend to
~ ~ employees have a
interpret information to avoid ~ 0 n f l i c t . lAlso,
"cognitive conservatism" that makes it difficult to readjust one's
perspective to account for new information,19' particularly if, as some
theorize, corrupt corporate behavior begins with acts that are only
minimally improper, which then gradually expand into larger acts of
w r o n g d ~ i n g . When
' ~ ~ combined with a bias for the status quo and a
tendency to perceive information as normal rather than abnormal,
employees face difficulties as unbiased corporate monitors.'99
These difficulties suggest that employees should not be a
corporation's sole source of monitoring. But, employees can, and
should, be one part of the overall corporate monitoring system. As
part of that system, a visible and legitimate whistleblower disclosure
channel that encourages and responds to the reporting of
misconduct may cause employees to give credence to their own
concerns by challenging their inherent assumptions and biases. The
structure of an effective disclosure channel will reduce disincentives
to coming forward by reducing corporate and societal pressures to
remain quiet. When implemented in conjunction with anti-

195. See Westin, supra note 54, at 143-49.
196. See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-87 (describing this tendency as "motivated
inference").
197. See id. at 87-88.
198. SeeDarley,supranote 175,at 1 1 8 6 8 8 .
199. See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-90 (discussing these same attributes as they
apply to whether supervisors can capably monitor employees to prevent wrongdoing).
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retaliation protections, the Structural Model should encourage more
whistleblowing from corporate employees.

B. Less Blocking and Filtering

A second significant benefit of the Structural Model is that it
should increase whistleblowers' effectiveness by providing a channel
for employees to bypass potential blocking and filtering by corporate
executives and to report information directly to the board of
directors. Moreover, because the channel to the board is relatively
unfiltered, such information may prompt directors to critically
examine information received from the corporate managers that
might be contradictory to that of the employee. This critical
examination is likely because directors "have a tremendous
reputational stake in compliance with the law, and almost no
countervailing financial stake in its violation . . . [therefore, they] are
likely to insist on correcting internal problems rather than covering
them up. 7,200 Providing reports to the traditional monitors,
particularly the board of directors, will be the key to the Model's
success.
Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model makes it more
difficult for directors to ignore the information received from
whistleblowing employee^.^^' One problem with the traditional
monitoring system is that it relies upon a liability system that makes
proof of a monitor's breach of fiduciary care extremely difficult
unless direct knowledge of wrongdoing is demonstrated. Thus, the
traditional system encourages directors to avoid receiving
information about potential misconduct in the corporation because
there is no breach of fiduciary duty when the directors have no direct
knowledge of wrongdoing.
The Structural Model makes it more difficult for directors to
avoid the type of knowledge that makes them responsible for
corporate wrongdoing. Most whistleblowing systems provide
effective documentation of information passed from an employee to
the responsible monitor. Indeed, afier the recent corporate scandals,
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were amended to require
that the organization's "governing authority7'-most likely the board
200. Kostant, supra note 69, at 556 (citing David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate
Law, 149 U . PA. L. REV. 1811,1812 (zuul)).
201. See Developments in the Law, supra note 71, at 2247 11.134.

of directors-must have knowledge about, ar,d exercise reasonable
oversight of, the compliance program.202Part of this oversight must
include receiving annual reports from individuals who are
operationally responsible for the program.203 Similarly, under
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model, directors could not claim-as
they did with Enron-that
they were unaware of potential
misconduct. Although directors may still ignore or underestimate the
information because it comes from a source outside of their small
g r o ~ p , 2 "they
~ will do so at their own peril. At a minimum, a
disclosure channel forces directors to either confront officers with
the information or be liable for their failure to do so. In this way, the
Structural Model reinforces the already-existing duties and
obligations of the traditional monitors.
Thus, by circumventing the blocking and filtering of corporate
executives, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model will make
whistleblower disclosures more effective because disclosures to
directors are more likely to cause the corporation to address the
misconduct of its executives and managers.
C. Secondary Benefits
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model is likely to provide significant
benefits directly to the corporation and thereby gain organizational
acceptance. Indeed, the history of the Structural Model
demonstrates that such organizational acceptance is crucial for the
Model to work. For example, the disastrous reign of two Special
Counsels eviscerated the disclosure provisions of the Civil Service
Reform Act because they did not follow through on employee
disclosures effectively.205For organizational acceptance to occur, the
benefits of this Model to the corporation must outweigh its costs. A
corporation will implement a truly workable and effective disclosure
system when encouraging whistleblowers is in its best interest.
Fortunately, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model could provide
significant benefits directly to the corporation.

-

202.
203.
204.
205.

-

--

-

OSG, supra note 125, § 8B2.l(b)(2)(A),Application Note 1.
Id. $ 8B2.l(b)(2)(C),Application Note 3.
See Fanto, supra note 24, at 460-72.
See discussion supra Part 1II.B.
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1 . Encouraging internal whistleblowing

An important benefit for corporations is that the Structural
~ ~ ~ an employee
Model encourages internal ~ h i s t l e b l o w i n g .When
reports wrongdoing internally rather than externally, corporations
learn about mistaken employee views and perspectives before these
mistaken views are made public, at which point they are harder to
correct.207This early detection allows corporations to avoid costs
related to the negative publicity and government intervention that
~ ~also
~ gives corporations the
follows external w h i s t l e b l ~ w i n g .It
opportunity to correct misconduct earlier and thereby save costs
related to future litigation.209Furthermore, internal whistleblowing
may attract whistleblowers who are loyal to the corporation and thus
' ~ whistleblowers
are motivated to improve the c o r p ~ r a t i o n . ~These
also are less likely to experience retaliation when they report
internally rather than externally.*ll
One criticism of encouraging internal whistleblowing is that it
may not be beneficial for society because misconduct is more easily
hidden and covered up if it is reported internally.212However,
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model should reduce this negative
aspect of internal whistleblowing by directing whistleblower reports
to corporate monitors who are subject to sanctions for failing to
investigate and disclose material misconduct.213 Moreover, the
Structural Model does not prohibit external whistleblowing-it
206. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN,WHISTLEBLOWING:
THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE169 (1991) ("Employees may be less likely to complain outside their
organizations if they believe that their companies have effective internal mechanisms for
expressing dissent and achieving change."); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 300-02.
207. See Callahan et al., supra note 102, at 904-06; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note
137, at 299-300; Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They
Working?,25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241,243 (1987);Vaughn, supra note 89, at 599.
208. See Callahan et al., supra note 102, at 882, 904-06; Dworkin & Near, supra note
207, at 242.
209. See Culp, supra note 160, at 124, 132; Robert G. Vaughn et al., The Whistleblower
Statute Prepared for The Organization of American States and The Global Legal Revolution
Protecting Whistleblowers,35 GEO.WASH. INT'L L. REV.857,868 (2003).
210. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 299-300.
211. See id. at 302; Dworkin &Near, supra note 109, at 6.
212. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 284; Stewart J. Schwab, Wronaful
Dischavge Law and the Search for Third-Paq Effects, 74 TEX.L. REV. 1943, 1966-68 (1996).
213. See Cheny, supra note 8, at 1073 (noting that the reporting channel of SarbanesOxley would provide evidence for government investigators and plaintiffs attorneys regarding
corporate knowledge of wrongdoing).

simply facilitates internal whistleblowing in order to encourage a
greater overall amount of whistleblowing.

2. Better corporate decision-making
T o the extent that a corporation truly implements structural
changes that improve the flow of information, corporate decisionmaking should improve.214Boards of directors need to be open to
different and dissenting points of view in order to improve the
.~~~
from studies of
quality of their d e c i s i ~ n - m a k i n ~Evidence
corporate boards demonstrates that "companies do best if they have
highly contentious boards 'that regard dissent as an obligation and
that treat no subject as undiscussable.' Well-functioning boards
contain a range of viewpoints and encourage tough questions,
challenging the prevailing orthodoxy."216 In accordance with this
viewpoint, Professor James Fanto suggested improving the board of
directors by appointing outside directors to play a "whistleblowing"
function in order to combat pervasive "group think."217 SarbanesOxley's Structural Model augments this suggestion by directing
actual whistleblowers to disclose information to the board of
directors, thereby providing the board information with which to
make more informed decisions.
O n a broader note, the Structural Model also helps encourage
dissent more generally by encouraging employees to speak out
immediately and directly. This process may lead to better decisionmaking for the corporation because groups make better decisions
when a variety of viewpoints are considered.218Without dissent from
individuals, groups tend to conform to more extreme positionspositions not held individually by most of the members of the
Moreover, dissenters can play an important role in breaking
informational cascades, in which a group of people uniformly fall in
line with a few influential people who may or may not have complete
214. See, e.B., MICELI&NEAR,supra note 6 , at 228-29.
215. See SUNSTEIN,supra note 159, at 2; O'Connor, supra note 23, at 1304-06; Westin,
supra note 54, at 138-39.
supra note 159, at 2.
216. SUNSTEIN,
217. See Fanto, szrpra note 24, at 507-09.
218. See SUNSTEIN,supra note 159, at 9 ("[C]lose-knit groups, discouraging conflict and
disagreement, often do badly because of this type o f conformity. The problem is that people
are failing to disclose what they know and believe.").
2 19. Seegenerally id. at 11 1-44 (discussing "group polarization").
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access to full information.220 The essential problem with such
cascading is that individuals with a minority view often self-censor in
the face of this group pressure, which keeps valuable information
from the group and leads to inferior decision-making.221Through a
disclosure channel, whistleblowers can provide an important
dissenting voice which may improve a corporation's decisionmaking, particularly at the board level.
3. Reducing monitoring costs
Despite the many benefits of prompt and efficient
whistleblowing, whistleblowing-like any monitoring mechanismhas its costs. Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model, however, minimizes
those costs and, where appropriate, reduces the costs of
whistleblowing more effectively than the Anti-retaliation Model.
The Structural Model has obvious costs associated with
maintaining a structure to receive, disseminate, and investigate
employee disclosures.222These costs, of course, vary depending upon
the complexity of the system223and may affect smaller companies
more than larger ones.224However, when the SEC enacted rules
implementing the structural changes of section 301, it did not
receive any specific data in response to its request for information
22~
signaling that the
related to possible costs of such ~ ~ s t e m s , perhaps
cost of such structures is not overwhelming for public companies.226

220. See id. at 66-73.
221. See id. at 118.
222. See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,813 (noting that there will be "ongoing
costs" in establishing procedures for handling complaints and in monitoring compliance with
those procedures).
223. Cf:Matthias Schmidt, 'TVhistle BlowingU Rt.gulation and Accounting Standards
Enforcement in Germany and Europe-An Economic Perspective 26 (Humboldt Univ. Bus. &
Econ. Discussion, Paper No. 29, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=438480
(noting that for intemal whistleblowing rules to be effective, tremendous company resources
may be required, such as continuous training for management and employees, implementing
hotlines, and identifying ombudspersons).
224. See SEC Release, strpra note 147,at 18,816.
225. See id. at 18,814.
226. Anecdotal evidence also supports the notion that companies may not find the cost of
certain disclosure systems prohibitive, particularly when compared with the benefit of increased
employee monitoring. See generally Judy Dahl, Whistle-Blower Program Lets Employees Speak
Up, DIRECTORSNEWSLETTER (Credit Union), Dec. 2005 (on file with author) (describing
the whistleblower hotline implemented by Texas credit union, which the credit union's
intemal auditor called a "bargain").

In addition to the mechanical nuts and bolts of implementing a
reporting system, opportunity costs must be considered. Executives
and managers monitored by employees might forgo activity that is
profitable and legal, but that may put them at risk of being
reported.227Shareholders might want these executives and managers
to test, or even to cross, the boundaries of legality because at times it
may be more profitable for shareholders if a corporation violates the
law, particularly if the penalties and the chance of being caught are
Yet corporations already incur these opportunity costs
because of current employee monitoring unrelated to the Structural
Model. As Professor Larry Backer has noted,
[Mluch of the obligations imposed on directors, officers and
gatekeepers, all fall on employees. Employees are usually the people
who actually gather the information necessary for the b c t i o n i n g
of the due diligence, monitoring, or information systems mandated
by [Sarbanes-Oxley] and related statutes. Employees tend also to
be responsible for first cut analysis and decisions with respect t o the
relevance of particular bits of information. T o a large extent, a large
firm must rely on its employees, a large number of whom must be
trusted t o gather, analyze and produce information that is essential
for the compliance by responsible officers, directors and
gatekeepers of their legal obligations.229

Increasing the role of employees in corporate governance by
encouraging them to report misconduct may not dramatically
increase these opportunity costs. While employees are already asked
to monitor, corporations fail to offer an incentive to accurately
report their findings to corporate leadership. Thus, because all
monitoring mechanisms have costs that must be considered in

227. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 284; see also MIETHE,supra note 49, at 87 (noting
that over-surveillance o f employees can lead to employees that are overly cautious).
228. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6 , at 10 ("[Elthical issues aside, from a
shareholder's standpoint, illegal acts may be worthwhile if their expected benefits outweigh
their expected costs. In addition, some investors may view managerial attempts to test the legal
waters as preferable to always proceeding in a risk-averse manner. Wealth-maximizing
shareholders may consider it desirable for managers to occasionally get caught uying to cheat."
(quoting Wallace N. Davidson I11 & Dan L. Worrell, The Impact of Announcements of
Corporate Illegalities on Shareholder Returns, 31 ACAD.MGMT.J. 195, 198 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
229. Larry Cati Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.327,370.
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comparison to the costs of other c0ntrols,2~~
it is noteworthy that the
marginal opportunity costs of encouraging employees to report
misconduct may not be significant given employees' current
monitoring roles.
Another cost of encouraging whistleblowing (and the
monitoring that goes along with it) is that a corporation may
discover wrongdoing for which it may be liable to some third
party.231When a company exposes its own employee's wrongdoing,
it can incur financial penalties, litigation expenses, negative publicity,
and increased scrutiny by regulators.232This cost is not uniform
among companies and will be greater for those corporations that are
engaging in fraudulent activities.233Assuming most companies are
not acting illegally, this overall cost may be insignificant for the vast
majority of corporations.234
Furthermore, these costs may seem higher to corporations than
they really are because managers often confuse their own personal
costs with costs to the corporation. As Professor Richard Painter
notes, "[mlanagers often lose their careers if misconduct is disclosed,
whereas organizations may suffer only temporary loss of reputation.
Managers usually bear the brunt of criminal liability for misconduct,
whereas organizations do not go to jail. 7,235 In short, while
corporations may actually benefit from getting caught early because
wrongdoing is thereby forestalled, managers may underemphasize
these benefits because getting caught can be a personal disaster for
managers.236A corporation's agents-its managers and executivesmay not implement protections that would benefit the corporation
itself because of the increased risk to the agent. The Structural

230. Cf Kraakman, supra note 19, at 75-87 (discussing costs of legal enforcement
through third-party liability).
231. Cf Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of
Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 224 (1995) (noting that an
obvious cost to clients o f engaging an attorney who will be a whistleblower is the "cost o f
misconduct being exposed").
232. See MICELI& NEAR, supra note 6 , at 282; see also ROBERTAANN JOHNSON,
WHISTLEBLOWING:
WHENIT WORKS-AND WHY75 (2003).
233. See Painter, supra note 231, at 224,263.
234. See id. at 224.
235. Id. at 263-64. Of course, management turnover may impose its own costs, such as
replacement costs and a "loss o f cohesion within the organization." See Langevoort, supra note
181, at 295-96.
236. See Painter, supra note 231, at 263-64

Model addresses this "agency failurev-whereby
managers
"overemphasize costs and underemphasize benefits" of getting
caught?37-because it increases corporate compliance and facilitates
earlier detection of corporate fraud.
Another cost of whistleblowing comes from likely error,
including intentional error by purported whistleblowers.
Whistleblowers could use the system opportunistically to gain some
sort of job security by disclosing imaginary m i s c o n d ~ c t , 2to~ ~achieve
an advantage in promotion or salary by wrongly reporting a coemployee,239or simply to hurt the employer in retaliation for some
perceived slight.240Alternatively, reporting errors could occur simply
because an employee does not hlly understand an ambiguous and
complex situation in which it might be difficult to discern legal from
illegal conduct.241The costs of such erroneous claims include costs
associated with internal investigations, litigation expenses,
opportunity costs, potential penalties, and costs related to becoming
a possible target for government regulators.242
The Structural Model can reduce the costs of whistleblowing
errors, whether made maliciously or in good faith, because the
Model channels whistleblower disclosures internally rather than

237. See id. at 264-65.
238. See MICELI& NEAR, supra note 6, at 7; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 286; Schmidt,
supra note 223, at 21; Westin, supra note 54, at 134. The costs here mirror the typical list of
costs that are asserted regarding any restriction on a corporation's ability to fire its employees
at-will. See James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 6 0 U .
COLO. L. REV. 91, 99, 123 (1989) (arguing that inhibiting the right of an employer to fire an
employee will raise the cost of labor because it reduces the ability to fire inefficient employees,
which makes the em~lover's
. , workforce less efficient. and thus more costlv.
., and it will also raise
the costs of administrating the employment relationship because it will lead to spurious claims
that increase litigation and administrative expenses). See ~enerally Steven L. Willborn,
Individrral Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism,
6 7 NEB.L. REV. 101 (1988).
239. Cf:Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 884 (1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern about protecting whistleblowers in the workplace because it
encourages employees to turn in other employees).
240. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty
and Obedience:A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA.L. REV. 279,298 (1971).
241. See id.; see also Westin, srrpra note 54, at 134 ("Putting the whistle to one's lips does
not guarantee that one's facts are correct.").
242. See Gerald Vinten, Enortgh is Enottgh: An Employer's View-The Pink Affair, in
WHISTLEBLOWING-SUBVER~ION
OR CORPORATECITIZENSHIP?,
supra note 7, at 118-32
(describing the costs incurred by an employer that investigated thoroughly but could not
substantiate a whistleblower's claims); Kraakman, supra note 19, at 60.
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externally.243Although there will be investigative costs, a corporation
that receives erroneous disclosures internally at least has the
possibility of providing feedback and correct information to a
whistleblowing employee.244This early response may keep a good
faith whistleblower from going public with flawed information, thus
reducing the overall costs of defending against such charges.
Moreover, even when a good faith whistleblower makes a public
accusation in the face of contrary evidence, the company will have
investigated the complaints and will be able to explain publicly the
reasons why those complaints were disregarded after the internal
investigation.245
With regard to malicious whistleblowers who intentionally make
false claims, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model may actually reduce
costs associated with such accusations. Employers likely will
document any whistleblowing disclosures made through the
approved channel as well as any subsequent investigation, which may
lessen the factual "he said/she said" nature of whistleblowing claims
regarding when a disclosure was made, the content of the disclosure,
and the relationship of the disclosure to an employment action.
Moreover, whistleblower disclosures may never be provided to
supervisors who make employment decisions, thus shielding these
supervisors from unintentionally retaliating against a whistleblower.
Furthermore, the Structural Model will enable corporations to
prevent intentional retaliation by fmstrated managers, which also will
reduce litigation expenditures.
Finally, a common argument against promoting whistleblowing
is that it will undermine corporate culture by encouraging secrecy,
destabilizing management authority, and diminishing morale.246
Each of these phenomena represents potential costs for a
corporation. Whistleblowing may damage a corporation's ability to
maintain confidential business information, thus forcing it to create
systems to maintain secrecy of its vital corporate i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~It~is'
costly to create these additional systems, and further costs are
243. It should be noted that incidents of malicious whistleblowing are rare. See Dworkin
& Callahan, supra note 137, at 303.

244.
245.
246.
at 343.
247.

See id. at 304.
See Westin, supra note 554, at 150.
See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 333; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9 ,
See Blumberg, supra note 240, at 297.

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW

[2006

incurred because the systems inefficiently restrict the normal sharing
~~'
whistleblowing can undermine
of corporate i n f ~ r m a t i o n . Similarly,
the organizational chain of command, which may reduce the
efficiencies gained by having a clear corporate decision-making
~ t r u c m r e In
.~~
fact,
~ any decrease in the authority of management
imposes costs, as managers must spend additional time justifying
themselves and their commands.250Reduced morale, among both
executives and employees, also may lead to less productivity and
efficiency. In its extreme version, this argument analogizes a culture
of whistleblowing to the type of informing that is encouraged by
tyrannical regimes.251
Certainly an overly-rigorous surveillance program may lead to
"risk-aversion and frustration that stem from the fear that one will be
incorrectly second-guessed."252 Yet the actual effect of increased
encouragement of whistleblowing on a corporation's culture is
unclear. As an initial matter, the concern that encouraging
whistleblowing will cause corporate disruption seems to lack
demonstrable support in the extensive social science research
regarding whistle blower^.^^^ As mentioned above, this research
supports the opposite conclusion: that whistleblowers typically are
loyal employees dedicated to the organization's goals.254
Furthermore, most employees are accustomed to surveillance by
managers and other superiors through performance reviews and
evaluative metrics, such that additional monitoring is unlikely to
affect morale negatively. Moreover, the Structural Model encourages
whistleblowing within the corporate system, which should work to
maintain corporate secrets rather than exposing them to outsiders.
Sarbanes-Oxley's emphasis on internal whistleblowing should also

248. See id.; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 60.
249. See JOHNSON,supra note 232.
250. See MICELI& NEAR, supra note 6, at 9-10; see also Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319
A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. 1974) (denying whistleblower claim because whistleblower bypassed
immediate supervisors in his reporting and breached the chain of command, and approving of
the company discharging him "to preserve administrative order in its own house").
251. See Peter F. Drucker, What is "Business Ethicsw?, 63 PUB.INT. 18 (1981).
252. See Langevoort, supra note 27, at 309.
253. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 303-04 (summarizing research and
concluding that "[flears that internal whistleblowing is disruptive of employee control and
productivity, or that it serves purely private interests, are unsupported by social-psychological
research" (citation omitted)).
254. Id. at 301-03.
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keep the potential for organizational disruptions to a minimum
because it reinforces, rather than undermines, the corporate
hierarchy. By providing information to the board of directors rather
than to corporate management, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model
emphasizes the primacy of the board of directors as a regulatory
player in the corporate structure.
4. Increasing employee voice

Whistleblower disclosure channels also benefit corporations by
giving corporate employees greater voice through an additional
avenue of participation in corporate governance.255With union
membership on the decline, the opportunity for employee
participation in the workplace has been greatly reduced, leading to
higher worker turnover and lower worker satisfaction.256Providing
the employee with more voice and participation in the workplace by
encouraging whistleblowing can lead to longer employee tenure and
less turnover.257Because work is where an employee gets a "sense of
community and self-worth," increased involvement in corporate
governance is valuable for an employee.258Stability is also enhanced
by the increased morale that occurs "when employees understand
that they can stop wronghl conduct and contribute to shaping a
working environment in which they can take pride."259Additionally,
corporations benefit from cooperative relationships with their
employees; such relationships increase corporate productivity by
encouraging employees to develop firm-specific skills. This will in
turn increase employee efficiency.260

255. See Dworkin, supra note 102, at 459; Estlund, supra note 9, at 108 ("[E]mployee
participation in workplace governance is increasingly viewed as both an intrinsic and an
instrumental good.").
THE WORKPLACE:
THE FUTUREOF M O R
256. See, e.g., PAULC. WEILER,GOVERNING
AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW 29 (1990); Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104
HARV.L. REV. 607, 624 n.86 (1990) (reviewing WEILER).
257. See RICHARDB. FREEMAN& JAMES L. MEDOFF,WHAT DO UNIONSDO? 162-80
(1984); Estlund, supra note 77; Issacharoff, supra note 256, at 624.
258. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 108.
259. Callahan et al., supra note 124, at 196; see also MICELI&NEAR,supra note 6, at 12.
260. See Estlund, supra note 77. Professor Estlund summarizes the reasons why a
corporation may not implement such structural protections and reforms on its own, even if
they increase productivity. Such reasons include (1) the possibility that increased productivity
may not lead to increased profits, (2) the difficulty for managers who desire control to
understand the value to the corporation of employee voice and participation, and (3) the long-

Yet, this relationship between employees and employers must
and providing
have structure before these benefits can be
structural
encouragement
for
employee voice
through
whistleblowing is a good beginning. Incorporating employees as part
of a broad corporate governance system is not as impractical as it
sounds; in fact, scholars have suggested involving employees in
corporate governance for decades.262For example, much of the
union movement has rested upon employees becoming more
involved in their working conditions. The movement to broaden
corporate accountability to "stakeholders" rather than only
"shareholders" recognizes employees as important players in the
corporation.263Although employee-designated directors are rare in
the United
some large employers initiate "employee
participation programs," in which employees are involved in
cooperative efforts with corporate management.265
Significantly, encouraging whistleblowing regarding financial
crime under Sarbanes-Oxley may be more successhl than previous
attempts to encourage whistleblowing regarding other types of
corporate misconduct because those previous attempts were
fundamentally adversarial. In the union context, employee voice
through unionization traditionally has been met with hostility by
management because of a union's perceived negative effect on
profitability.266Similarly, with regard to the health and safety of
employees or the public, previous efforts to encourage
whistleblowing required corporations to internalize costs they might

term benefits of encouraging employee voice may be intangible when compared with shortterm benefits a corporation believes it receives by reducing employee voice. See id. at 110 n.25.
261. See id. at 109 ("Employee voice, to be effective in workplace governance and in
monitoring regulatory compliance, must be channeled into workable and representative
structures with power within the workplace . . . .").
262. See, ea., Michael H . LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium:
RedeFning a Labor Ovganization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S . CAL. L. REV.
1651, 1653-54 & n.8 (1999) (discussing team-based workplaces).
263. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Stattltes, 21 STETSONL. REV.45,48-50 (1991).
264. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 1243 (noting that an exception to this rule is
employee-owned United Air L i e s ) .
265. See, ea., LeRoy, supra note 262, at 1661-66; Robert B. Moberly, The Story of
Electromation, in LABOR LAW STONES 315, 320-22 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk
eds., 2005).
266. See FREEMAN& MEDOFF,supra note 257, at 181-83.
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rather externalize.267For instance, dumping toxic waste may be
cheaper for corporations to do illegally rather than legally. Increasing
employee hazards or underpaying an employee for overtime might
ultimately cost less than complying with employee safety and wage
legislation. There is thus an inherent conflict of interest in asking
corporations to encourage whistleblowing when corporations will
lose money if misconduct is exposed. Financial crime, however, less
clearly benefits the corporation and its shareholders. Encouraging
whistleblowing regarding financial crime, which by its nature benefits
shareholders, might be easier to implement because the
corporation's self-interest is involved.
V. STRENGTHENING THE STRUCTURAL
MODEL
A. Mandating the Model Efectively

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the first attempt to mandate a
whistleblower disclosure channel in the private sector. Yet, despite its
broad application to all publicly-traded corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley
fails to detail any specifics regarding the disclosure channel. The Act
requires only a single channel for employees of public companies to
report questionable accounting or auditing matters.268 This
mandatory implementation is important and necessary, but it is too
limited in scope.
T o be sure, government-mandated whistleblower regulation
affects corporate autonomy and an employer's relationship with its
employees. Traditionally, such regulations have been justified only
where whistleblowers patently serve a public
I n those cases,
government protection is necessary because corporations would not
otherwise reap benefits from reporting conduct hurtful to the public,
such as environmental law violations or improper use of government
funds.270Consistent with this rationale, common law courts typically
267. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1970.
268. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301,15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(B)(2001-2003)
269. See, e a . , JOHNSON, supra note 232; Schwab, supra note 212, at 1945 (discussing
protection of whistleblowers who report activities that have "third-party" effects).
270. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1970. As put by Dean Schwab in 1996, five years
before Enron declared bankruptcy:
Certainly, a billion-dollar financial fraud involving elderly pensioners can have
greater harm on third parties than a trivial oil spill. But in general, companies have
great internal incentives to police financial fraud, either to protect their shareholders

provide greater protections to whistleblowers who disclose
information that affects a public, rather than a private, interest.271
When only a private corporate interest is at stake, such as in the case
of shareholder fraud or internal corporate theft, whistleblowers have
not fared well in their claims for wrongful discharge.272In these
"private interest" cases, it is arguable that a corporation is due more
deference in its treatment of whistleblowers because the corporation
has the incentive to determine how much whistleblowing should be
permitted and encouraged.273
This same argument can be expanded to question the need for
government oversight of structural changes to corporate
whistleblowing. The argument follows that if the Structural Model
provides such benefits to the corporation by encouraging
whistleblowers, then perhaps the law should not require these
reforms. Smart, self-interested corporations will adopt efficient
whistleblowing disclosure channels and prosper, while those entities
that do not encourage whistleblowing will founder.
This argument is in some senses effective. Indeed, the work of
the market in requiring whistleblower reforms already can be seen in
the aftermath of the corporate scandals. Various investor and
or their reputation among creditors. Companies often cannot capture the gains from
an action that protects public health or safety, and thus that factor often remains
external t o their calculus. Allowing a wrongful discharge action to be asserted by
employees fired for blowing the whistle on actions against public health and safety is
one small way t o encourage companies to internalize these costs.
Id.; see also Cynthia Estlund, WronClfirl Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 T E XL.
.
REV. 1655, 1674 (1996) (asserting that actions that are protected from retaliation benefit
third-parties and are "public goods that are likely to be 'underproduced' even without the
threat of retaliation").
271. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1970.
272. For example, whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing have not been
particularly successful in wronghl discharge suits. See, ed., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830
F.2d 1303, 1305-07 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding discharge of employee for preparing to
disclose commercial bribery and alteration of records); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 375, 380 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to protect employee who internally reported that a
supervisor was under investigation for past embezzlement); Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d
778, 788 (Okla. 1995) (refusing to protect employee who internally reported embezzlement
by a supervisor); Fox v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Utah 1997) (finding
that employee was not wronghlly discharged because employee's internal disclosure regarding
statutory violations did not implicate a clear and substantial public policy).
273. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1949 (noting that a corporation "is in the best
position to weigh whether the information the employer gains from co-worker tattling is worth
the cost of breakdowns in the corporate chain of command and reduced trust among
coworkers").
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industry groups pressured corporations to utilize their employees to
help detect fraud and other criminal activity. For example, in 2005 a
group of Wal-Mart's institutional shareholders requested that the
company review its internal controls, in part because of concern that
the company weakened the resolve of its employees to report
wrongdoing when Wal-Mart fired an employee who disclosed
alleged accounting abuse by the corporate vice-chairman.274
Similarly, the chairman of Nortel Networks recently disclosed that
no employee at any level of the company alerted the board to
accounting improprieties that were revealed the previous year.275In
response, the corporation publicized to its shareholders that it
voluntarily instituted a "whistleblower system" for employees to raise
concerns to an officer who "answers to" the CEO and the chairman
of the board.276
Other market forces may encourage whistleblowers to report
matters externally if internal whistleblowers are not supported. A
group called Wal-Mart Watch recently placed thousands of phone
calls to Bentonville, Arkansas, Wal-Mart's headquarters, attempting
to encourage employees "who know[] of wrongdoing" inside the
company to come forward with information.277In short, from the
"free market" perspective, the market and other non-governmental
forces can and do provide incentives to corporations to encourage
the disclosure of internal fraud by their employees.
But these market forces often do not work effe~tively.~~'
Although the market has begun pressuring large corporations to
encourage whistleblowers, several barriers exist that may prevent
274. See James Covert, Wal-Mart Urged To Review Controls, WALLST. J., June 2,2005,
at B7 (quoting a representative of an institutional investor as saying, "[ilndependent directors
need to demonstrate to shareholders that Wal-Mart hasn't built an ostrich culture-where
employees are better off sticking their heads in the sand than speaking up").
275. See David Paddon, Nortel Shareholders Vent Anger cmer Fallen Stock Price,
PRESS,June 29, 2005, available at http://www.cbc.ca/cp/
Accounting Scandal, CANADIAN
business/050629/b062984.html.
276. Id. In addition, Volkswagen AG recently responded to disclosures of alleged bribe~y
and other wrongdoing by corporate executives by announcing that it would hire two
ombudsmen to receive anonymous employee complaints. See Stephen Power, Volknvagen
Strengthens Controls In Wake of Internal Bribery Probe, WALLST. J., Nov. 12,2005,at A4.
277. See John Hanvood, Washington Wire: Help Wanted, WALLST. J., June 3, 2005, at
A4.
278. Securities regulation is justified, in part, because a collective action problem often
prevents dispersed shareholders from implementing reforms that could better protect their
interests. See McDonnell, supra note 178,at 535.

corporations from voluntarily implementing a sufficient system. For
example, it may be efficient for corporations not to monitor
effectively because the law may under-enforce certain regulationseither because there is imperfect monitoring or because penalties are
set too low, or both-thus encouraging certain wrongdoing that is
profitable.279Further, it is unlikely that the majority of public
companies will draw the type of media and investor scrutiny that
Wal-Mart has encountered. Additionally, managers may implement
less-than-effective monitoring systems because they personally
benefit from certain undetected misconduct by their subordinates
but do not incur significant costs from these violations.280Moreover,
even if corporate directors believe that the corporation would benefit
from increased monitoring by its employees, managers and
supervisors may block such changes because they resent increased
monitoring and supervision. By mandating a structural
whistleblowing approach, the law can relieve pressure on
corporations and lessen the extent to which supervisors may feel that
their employers are imposing a whistleblowing system because of a
lack of u ~ s t . ~ "
Despite the private-public distinction made by some c0urts,2~~
reducing illegal corporate fraud actually affects the larger public
interest as well as the corporate private interest.283Corporate fraud
undermines the public's confidence in the financial market and
reduces the market's transparency and security.2s4Moreover, today's
279. See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 80.
280. See id.
281. See Cunningham, strpra note 142, at 293 ("Mandatory controls serve a sanitizing
function for modulating the trust-suspicion trade-off. Controls mandated by law may be
imposed by the corporation o n employees without expressing a particularized mistrust of
them."); Sturm, supra note 129, at 520-21 (noting that the law can help "justify the
implementation of initiatives lacking short-term economic pay-off, and legitim[ize] the pursuit
of ethical values of fairness and respectful treatment in the workplace").
282. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1949 (explaining that the private/public distinction
is often more conclusory than helpful).
283. See id. at 1970 ("The legislature presumably declared the act illegal in order to
protect the public from wrongdoing.").
284. See 148 CONG.REc. S73.52, S7360 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statements of Sen.
Gramm and Sen. Kerry). As noted by the SEC when it issued rules requiring that audit
committees set up a system to receive employee complaints:
[vligilant and informed oversight by a strong, effective and independent audit
committee could help t o counterbalance pressures t o misreport results and impose
increased discipline on the process of preparing financial information. Improved
oversight may help detect fraudulent financial reporting earlier and perhaps thus
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modern corporations are the center of the economic universe, and
corporate fraud can harm entire communities-not just corporate
shareholders.285 Given their large effect o n the public interest,
whistleblowers may actually be more necessary in the private sector
than in the public sphere. As Professor Phillip Blumberg noted over
three decades ago, in the public sphere, an opposition party usually
will be able to provide oversight regarding the administration of the
government.286In a corporation, however, a whistleblower may be
more necessary because shareholders or a board of directors may not
be able to control management.287If effect on the public interest is
the sine qua non of government intervention, then reducing
corporate fraud should satisfy this standard, particularly in light of
the significant public impact of the recent corporate scandals.
Thus, the government can address weaknesses of the "free
market" approach by imposing some structural reform.288SarbanesOxley's mandatory approach to whistleblower disclosure channels
improves upon previous versions of the Structural Model, which
provided only weak incentives for corporations to implement
structural change.

deter it or minimize its effects. AU of these benefits imply increased market efficiency
due to improved information and investor confidence in the reliability of a
company's financial disclosure and system of internal controls.
SEC Release, supra note 147,at 18,813.
285. Thousands of Enron employees lost their jobs and, as a group, Enron employees
lost over one billion dollars in retirement accounts containing a high proportion of Enron
stock. See Kroger, supra note 26, at 58 (noting that local businesses that relied on Enron and
its employees were negatively affected); Kate Murphy, Corporate Lepers, Local Heroes?, BUS.
W K . O N L I N EJune
,
30, 2005, hrtp://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2005/
nf20050630-0279-db017.htm ("Enron employees who lost their jobs and retirement savings
weren't the only people hurt. From local Porsche dealers to caterers, graphic designers, and
travel agents, many folks either went out of business or took a tremendous hit because of what
happened at Enron."); cf: Blumberg, supra note 240, at 299 (noting that large corporations
can have characteristics of a private government because of their large revenues and substantial
number of employees and shareholders).
286. See Blumberg, supra note 240, at 306.
287. See id.
288. T o the extent that a mandatory system remains unappealing, certain required
disclosures could still encourage the development of whistleblower systems. For example,
rather than mandate certain disclosure systems, regulators could develop a list of "best
practices" for such compliance systems. Corporations could comply with these practices or
disclose why they do not. See Paredes, supra note 18, at 526 (suggesting such a system for
corporate governance more broadly). Although this is a second-best option, it may prove more
viable in a regime where mandatory regulation is disfavored.

But how much regulation should there be? Section 301 imposes
a minimalist version of the Structural Model: it requires only that a
public company's audit committee establish procedures for receiving
complaints regarding accounting issues, including confidential,
anonymous concerns from employees.289 In many ways, not
requiring any specific procedures makes sense. Small corporations
may prefer to outsource the complaint procedure to a third-party to
handle "hotline" calls. Other corporations may determine that they
want a more investigative function and appoint ombudsmen or
ethics officers with broad responsibilities and reporting obligations.
In fact, social science research suggests that corporate structure
greatly impacts the type of encouragement necessary to effectively
encourage whistleblowing, such that a variety of approaches may be
s u c c e ~ s h lThis
. ~ ~ diversity
~
of options works well in an economy with
a wide variety of workplaces. Flexibility encourages experimentation
with a range of processes and ultimately will help develop various
best practices for industries and companies.291
T o realize the full potential of the Structural Model as a means of
improving corporate governance, however, certain specifics could be
fleshed out and expanded upon through legislation or regulation. In
particular, Sarbanes-Oxley's vagueness contributes to two significant
problems with its Structural Model.
The first problem is that the Model may not work well enou~b.
Specifically, without supplemental requirements, corporations might
easily implement a system that looks acceptable on paper but that is
not hnctional or effective in reality. As demonstrated above, this
"cheating" problem contributed to the failure of the Model prior to
the corporate scandals, and Sarbanes-Oxley does not fix the problem
sufficiently.292
Conversely, the second problem is that the Model may work too
well. Employees may make too many complaints about matters that
do not merit director investigation. In other words, a p o w e h l

289. SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2 0 0 2 $ 301, 15 U.S.C. $78j-l(m)(4) (Supp. 2002).
290. See Granville King 111, The Implications of an Organization's Structure on
Whistleblowing, 2 0 J. BUS. ETHICS315, 324 (1999).
291. See Sturm, srrpra note 129, at 492 (discussing structural systems to address
employment discrimination issues and criticizing a "one-size-fits-all model or a predetermined
set o f criteria" because it would "cut off the process o f organizational development and
experimentation that is so crucial to an effective regulatory system").
292. See discussion strpra Part 1II.B.
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Structural Model may provide too much information, called "noise,"
with only a fraction of the information actually proving usehl. Busy
corporate directors and officers may spend an inefficient amount of
time responding to insubstantial employee complaints.
The hture success of Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model depends
upon addressing both of these concerns. Below, I suggest solutions
that involve mandating slightly more structure than is currently
imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. These suggestions are aimed at
achieving an efficient level of information flow to directors, while still
permitting corporations flexibility in constructing whistleblower
disclosure systems that work best for their organizational
configuration.

B. Addressing the Cheating Problem
Perhaps the most widely cited problem with internal compliance
systems is that it can be easy for a corporation to "cheat" by
implementing a superficial and ineffective system.293 Outsiders,
specifically courts, prosecutors, or other administrative agencies, have
difficulty judging the effectiveness of a system because "the indicia of
an effective compliance system are easily
The difficulty
of accurate and thorough outside evaluation allows corporations to
install programs that look good on paper and permit them to check
the necessary compliance boxes but have little or no effect on
whether individuals in an organization commit less crime.295
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model also suffers from this
criticism. Corporations could implement a facially compliant
"disclosure channel" relatively easily, yet implicitly discourage the
use of the channel by director inattentiveness to complaints, lack of
publicity of the procedures necessary to utilize the program, or
subtle retaliation against employees who report misconduct. Given
-

-----

293. See, ea., Bowman, supra note 144, at 675; Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491;
Langevoort, supra note 181, at 106-07.
294. Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491-92; see also Langevoort, supra note 181, at 1 1718.
295. CJ Krawiec, supra note 142, at 487,491 (noting that such programs may be mere
"window-dressing" and can have several negative effects, including an "under-deterrence of
corporate misconduct." and "a proliferation o f costly-but arguably ineffective-internal
compliance structures"); Langevoort, supra note 181, at 106 (criticizing "values-based"
programs as being "easy to mimic, making it difficult to separate out the sincere programs
from the fakesn).
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the relative weakness of anti-retaliation laws to protect the more
subtle forms of discouragement, this cheating problem may
undermine the effectiveness of the Structural Model if it is not
addressed.
Tools typically found in the corporate regulatory regimedisclosure and incentives-may significantly mitigate the cheating
problem. First, corporations could be required to disclose
information regarding their whistleblowing channels. This disclosure
could include both a description of the structure of the channel as
well as its results, such as a summary of evaluative metrics about the
performance of the structure. Second, corporations could be given
more incentive to implement a hlly developed and effective
disclosure channel. One suggestion is that a corporation could be
provided a safe harbor from certain claims if it satisfies specific
whistleblower disclosure channel standards through a pre-approval
process. Surprisingly, although these tools were used in other parts
of Sarbanes-Oxley to bolster the Act's reform efforts, they were not
applied to support hrther encouragement of whistle blower^.^^^
1. Disclosure of structure and results

Cheating can be discouraged by requiring companies to disclose
information regarding both the structure of their whistleblowing
disclosure channel as well as the channel's results. In fact, disclosure
and transparency are important principles of limited government
regulation of markets.297Requiring disclosure can help directors and
other monitors perform their oversight functions. These monitors
will more readily comply with their duties of care and diligence
because they know that certain decisions and problems will be
exposed through a corporation's mandatory disclosure.298
Accordingly, Sarbanes-Oxley recognizes that other areas related to
internal enforcement should be disclosed.299Title IV of SarbanesOxley requires disclosure related to various financial and ethical
296. See infia text accompanying footnotes 299-303.
297. Backer, supra note 229, at 331 n.8; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale,
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859,
861 (2003).
298. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 297, at 872-75.
299. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (stating
that the purpose o f the Sarbanes-OxleyAct is to "protect investors by improving the accuracy
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws").
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obligations.300For example, a corporation must disclose whether or
not it has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers301as
well as any change in, or waiver of, the code for these officers.302
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that a corporation's annual report must
contain an "internal control report" that contains an assessment of
the effectiveness of its internal control structure.303
As they relate to whistleblowers, however, Sarbanes-Oxley's
disclosure provisions are narrowly drawn. A code of ethics would not
necessarily involve whistleblowers, and the disclosures for internal
controls relate only to financial reporting, which likely would not
detail the structure of a whistleblower disclosure channel.
Furthermore, in practice these internal control disclosures from
management are little more than boilerplate attestations from
executives.304
More could be required regarding the disclosure of
whistleblower channels. SEC regulations could require publication of
a description of the individuals responsible for top-level review of
complaints from employee whistleblowers and how that review is
accomplished, such as whether entire files are reviewed at that level
or whether and how files are screened. Further, corporations could
reveal whether the disclosure system is provided internally or is
outsourced (and to whom), the method by which employees are
encouraged to report misconduct, and the means by which employee
concerns are evaluated and investigated.305In other words, relatively
specific information about the system could be disclosed.

300. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §$ 401-09 (codified in scattered sections of title 15
of the United States Code (Supp. 2002)).
301. 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (Supp. 2002).
302. See id. § 7264(b).
303. See id. § 7262.
ANNUALREPORT 117 (2006), available a t
304. See, ea.,THECOCA-COLACOMPANY,
http://thecoca-colacompany.com/investors/forms/pdfs/form~10K~2005.pdf ("[Mlanagement believes that the Company maintained effective internal control over financial reporting
as of December 31,2005.").
305. See Letter from William F. Ezzell, CPA, Chairman, Board of Directors, & Barry C.
Melancon, CPA, President, and CEO, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, t o
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 18, 2003) (providing comments to SEC
regarding its implementation of Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: "The company should
annually disclose whether or not they have a system in place, and whether that system relies on
internal resources, or they have engaged an external service provider. If substantive changes are
made to the procedures during the year, that fact should be reported via Form 8-K and the
next annual disclosure should provide similar detail.").

As with other regular corporate disclosures, disclosures relating
to the whistleblower system could be required in a corporation's
periodic or annual reports as well as on corporate web site^.^'^ To
provide a hrther incentive for accurate information, these disclosures
could be certified by the head of the audit committee in the same
manner that other important corporate information requires
executive level certification when it is disclosed to the
These disclosures also could be posted internally, similar to other
federal employment law posting requirements,308so that employees
have direct knowledge of the procedures and results of employee
whistleblowing.
Of course, disclosure is not the answer to every problem.
Disclosure may be costly for corporations because compiling and
presenting the required information accurately can be an enormous
undertaking. Currently, corporations are revolting against SarbanesOxley's requirement that they disclose their internal financial
controls because they claim the costs are staggering.309Moreover,
too much disclosure to the market may produce too much
information for investors, such that the marginal benefit of the
disclosed information to investors does not justi@ the increased cost
to the corporation of making the disclosure.310

306. Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations currently require other information about a
corporation to be posted on corporate websites, such as statements related to the beneficial
ownership of securities of a corporation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(4)(C); 1 7 C.F.R § 240.16a3(k) (2006); see also 1 7 C.F.R § 229.406(~)(2)(permitting posting of required corporate
code of ethics onto corporate website). Similarly, the New York Stock Exchange requires each
of its listed companies to post its code of business conduct and ethics on their corporate
website. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,NYSE LISTED COMPANYMANUAL§ 303A.10
(20061,
http://www.nyse.com/RegulationFrameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse
.com/regulation/listed/l145486468873.html&displayPage=/listed/l022221393251 .html.
307. See, e.H., 15 U.S.C. 5 7241 (requiring personal certification by officers of various
publicly disclosed reports); id. § 1350 (requiring personal certification by officers of various
publicly disclosed reports).
308. See, e a . , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2000) (requiring the posting of notice to
employees regarding legal protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
309. See Deborah Solomon, At W h a t Price?, WALLST. J . , Oct. 17,2005, at R3.
310. See Letter from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.g0v/rules/proposed/s70203/
pricewaterl.htm (commenting to the SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of
Sarbanes-Oxley: "While we acknowledge the fact that these disclosures may be meaningful to
investors, we believe that there needs to be a balance between relevant information and
information overload.").
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However, the cost of disclosing the type of whistleblower
channels implemented by a corporation should not be great. It
would require nothing more than an accurate description of the
program, which would likely already be in corporate papers
authorizing it. T o counterbalance these costs, there are many
benefits to disclosing the whistleblower systems. For example, such
disclosure will reduce the temptation to implement systems that can
function as mere window-dressing, an easy way to avoid truly
encouraging whistleblowers. Corporations, and directors who certify
the disclosure, will face financial and possible criminal exposure if the
whistleblower system does not mirror its public description.
Also, corporations that provide certified public disclosures about
whistleblower channels would increase shareholder support. Such
disclosures provide shareholders the opportunity to assess the effort
corporations undertake to prevent fraud.311Shareholders may prefer
companies in which whistleblowing is encouraged through extensive
whistleblower systems because strong internal control systems may
lead to less regulatory oversight312as well as easier access to capital
through more positive assessments from credit-rating agencies.313In
this way, disclosure can provide signaling benefits because it sends "a
positive message to shareholders and regulators about checks on
management's conduct."314T o the extent shareholders value strong

311. See Schmidt, supra note 223, at 26-29 (arguing that disclosure of compliance
policies will put market pressure on corporations to institute whistleblower protections); cf:
Ribstein, supra note 17, at 291 ("A hlly informed market arguably ought to be able to
evaluate the adequacy of firms' monitoring and control mechanisms and to encourage firms to
efficiently balance the costs and benefits of adopting additional controls.").
312. See Painter, supra note 231,at 268 (noting that regulators have limited enforcement
budgets and might direct enforcement activity towards actors it believes have not given proper
incentives to encourage internal reporting, thus reducing costs because a regulator might
"require less frequent and less burdensome reporting, request fewer documents, and conduct
less extensive investigations"); Diya Gullapalli, Living With Sarbanes-Oxley, WALLST. J . , Oct.
17,2005,at R1 (noting that Dow Chemical strengthened its relationship with "key regulators
at the SEC and the accounting-oversight board" by developing a "reputation for transparency
and activism in compliancen).
313. Cf Painter, supra note 231,at 272 (noting that most investors rely on "reputational
intermediaries" because they cannot process all relevant information themselves).
314. Id. at 256. But see Letter from Charles M. Nathan, Comm. on Sec. Regulation of
the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb.
18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/cmnaanl.htm
(providing comments to the SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of SarbanesOxley and recommending that companies be allowed "to choose whether or not they disclose
their procedures for handling complaints").
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internal control systems, the required disclosure of whistleblower
polices could encourage managers to implement enhanced internal
controls to increase the company's attractiveness to shareholdet-s.315
Public information about weak internal controls, on the other hand,
will inform potential shareholders about risky investments with a
greater likelihood for fraud.316
Moreover, disclosure of whistleblower procedures will encourage
employees to report misconduct by giving them explicit instruction
on the best means of making whistleblower corn plaint^.^^' Under the
current Sarbanes-Oxley version of the Structural Model, there is no
obligation to publicize the existence of the disclosure procedures,
which may cause employees to underutilize the whistleblower
channel. This omission is odd given the utilization of such required
disclosures to employees in other federal employment statutes, such
as Title V I I . ~ ~ *
In addition to disclosing information regarding whistleblower
procedures, the SEC could issue regulations requiring corporations
to disclose the results of their whistleblower disclosure system.
Specifically, corporations could disclose information such as the
number of complaints received by the system, the types of
complaints (accounting, theft, discrimination, work conditions, etc.),
and the resolution or procedural posture of the complaints (found to
'~
could be
be without merit, substantiated, e t ~ . ) . ~Corporations
further required to disclose the current employment status of
employees who submitted complaints to clarie whether
whistleblowers suffer any tangible employment action during a
restricted period after they disclose information.320 Analogously,
under the NO FEAR Act, federal agencies disclose statistics

315. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 1277-78.
316. See MICELI& N m , supra note 6, at 14 ("[I]nvestors and potential investors who
are warned of financial wrongdoing may avoid the loss of substantial resources by investing in
more ethical or better managed organizations.").
317. See Near & Dworkin, supra note 112, at 1557; cf: Memorandum from Larry D.
Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S.
Att'ys 1 0 (Jan. 20,2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business-orgmizations.pdf.
318. See, e a . , 42 U.S.C. $2000e-10 (2000).
319. Cf:Callahan et al., supra note 124, at 210 (proposing that ombudsmen prepare
summaries of complaints received, the investigation, and any actions taken).
320. Auditors already are protected through a similar mechanism in which corporations
must report the discharge of an outside accountant. See SEC Form 8 - Y
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
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regarding the number and type of discrimination complaints each
agency received from its employees, including the results of those
complaints.321
Although reporting such specific results will add cost, the
marginal cost might not be significant because some organizations
already use these types of metrics to evaluate their internal
compliance systems.322For example, Intel measures the utilization
rate of its internal dispute resolution system, the number of internal
versus external complaints, the type of complaints and their
resolutions, and the perceived effectiveness of the system as
measured by employee and manager feedback.323
Publicizing specific results from a whistleblower disclosure
system might result in several benefits. First, disclosing specific
results will avoid a "lemon" problem that might develop, whereby
companies may be unable to signal that they have superior
whistleblowing procedures if companies with inferior procedures can
send similar signals.324Companies, in other words, will be put to
their proof regarding the results from their system, and they will not
merely be able to rely on impressive looking window-dressing.
Corporations will be forced to explain and to justify their disclosure
channel structure as well as their own evaluation of the structure's
effectiveness.325
Second, these public explanations from corporations will assist in
developing "best practices" and promote experimentation, while also

321. See Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-174, § 203,301,116 Stat. 566,569,573 (2002).
322. One recent survey found that seventy-five percent of U.S. public companies tracked
whether their ethical codes were followed. See Neil Baker, All Done With Mirrors?
Transparencyand Business Ethics, 59 INT'L BARRISTERNEWS4 , 5 (2005).
323. See Sturm, supra note 129, at 559 (describing Intel's assessment techniques). Intel is
certainly not alone in its attempt to evaluate the success of its own disclosure program. See
Kenneth D. Martin, Where Theoy and Reality Converge: Three Corporate Experiences in
Developing "Effectiven Compliance Programs, in GOOD CITIZEN,supra note 3, at 39-40
(describing metrics kept by Sundstrand Corp. regarding its compliance program)
324. Cf:George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemonsn: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 8 4 Q.J.ECON. 488, 488-89 (1970) (evaluating quality uncertainty by
examining good and bad cars); Painter, supra note 231, at 275-76 (describing this problem in
a market for attorneys who must report wrongdoing).
325. See Sturm, supra note 129, at 559 (describing a system whereby courts examine the
effectiveness of an internal grievance system by requiring employers "to develop and justify
criteria of effectiveness in problem solving for their own internal systems," thereby encouraging
"employers to . . . evaluate their own systems, rewarding employers who do so").

providing courts and regulators a viable means of judging the
effectiveness of a corporation's own system.326
Third, publishing results from whistleblowing systems will
encourage employees to report misconduct by providing them with
information regarding the effectiveness of their own monitoring
efforts. As discussed above, a significant disincentive for employees
to report misconduct is their concern that nothing will be done
about their report.327Requiring companies to disclose the results of
whistleblower disclosures will address this concern by demonstrating
that violators of ethical and legal norms will be held accountable.328
Assuming corporations disclose positive results, employees will begin
to trust the disclosure channel and be more willing to utilize it.
Furthermore, Professor Tom Tyler has argued that employees are
more willing to follow workplace rules and think positively about
their employer when the organization demonstrates that it treats
employees with procedural fairness.329Thus, publicizing that the
system "works" and that procedures are fairly administered not only
can encourage employees to report misconduct but also can persuade
employees to behave more appropriately themselves.
Fourth, publishing results can serve as an important impetus for
reform. For example, published results of whistleblower disclosures
under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) revealed that the Office
of Special Counsel (OSC) and the h4erit Systems Protection Board
failed to protect and encourage whistleblowers. In the eleven years
after passage of the CSRA, only one whistleblower received a hearing
by the OSC to restore the whistleblower's job.330On appeal to the
Merit Systems Protection Board, only four out of more than two
thousand whistleblowers won on the merits of their claims.331These
326. See id.; cf: Langevoort, supra note 181, at 114-15 (noting that the "legal standard
underlying an affirmative monitoring requirement" should "be set at a moderate height," such
as industry best practices). But see Letter from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton to U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 18, 2003), hrtp://ww.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s70203/clearygotl.htm ("Disclosure about procedures and changes to those
procedures map have m unintended chilling effect. If an issuer is forced to disclose its
procedures, the audit committee may be less innovative and less willing t o try different
approaches . . . .").
327. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
328. See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1200.
329. See Tom R Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work
Settingr: 7he Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287,1303-05 (2005).
330. See Devine, supra note 139, at 534.
331. Seeid.
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results served as partial impetus for the passage of the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, which addressed some of the perceived
problems with the CSRA's whistleblower system.332
Of course, corporations may still resist disclosure of results.
Mandatory disclosure requires the corporation to reveal potentially
embarrassing information publicly and may place employers at the
mercy of disgruntled employees. Furthermore, disclosing results may
have the opposite of the desired effect. Rather than increase
whistleblower disclosures, it may pressure managers to suppress
complaints in order to make a company's numbers look better.333
Yet, such disclosure is not markedly different than requiring
disclosure of earnings and revenue numbers that might embarrass the
corporation. Both types of disclosures aim to present a clearer picture
of the corporation to the investing public. As with financial numbers,
there should be no restriction on a corporation's truthful efforts to
explain and to just@ poor results.

2. Providing incentive
Corporations already receive limited incentives from the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) and various court
decisions to implement internal compliance systems. But as discussed
above, the usefulness of these incentives to create eflective systems is
questionable because the incentives do not necessarily prevent
cheating.334 Another form of incentive may better encourage
corporations to install and enforce effective systems that encourage
employee whistleblowing.
Corporations could be provided a safe harbor for installing
systems that meet SEC or other administrative standards for
effectiveness. Such standards might include specific requirements,
such as providing for an independent review of whistleblower claims
and intensive training of managers and employees. This safe harbor
might be granted through a pre-approval process in which an
administrative agency (such as the SEC) or a certified third-party
(such as an independent auditor) rigorously investigates and

332. See id. at 536 & 11.22; Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 282-83.
333. Cf: Coffee, supra note 19, at 1251-65 (noting that disclosure can raise a
corporation's "embarrassment cost" to a "prohibitively high level" that may actually restrict
information flow).
334. See discussion supra Part 1II.B.

evaluates systems for effectiveness. This pre-approval process would
avoid the tricky inquiry that arises when courts and prosecutors must
externally evaluate corporate programs a@er misconduct is detected.
The corporate benefits of pre-approval are also considerable: safe
harbors could provide a rebuttable presumption that the corporate
system is effective. Such a presumption would be enormously helpful
in criminal and civil litigation where proof of an effective
whistleblower system is significant.335
The mechanisms that could be used to implement a "safe
harbor" vary depending on the context. The OSG would necessarily
need to be amended in order to apply safe harbors to a criminal
sentencing.336In the case of punitive damages or sexual harassment,
legislation may need to be passed to recognize such a safe harbor.
Yet, even without such legislation, courts might implicitly implement
such a safe harbor by recognizing "certified" internal control systems
as meeting industry standards. Importantly, even where a
corporation had met "safe harbor" standards, it would still be
encouraged to prevent wrongdoing through other means because
the presumption would not reduce a company's vicarious liability for
the acts of its employees.337
This proposal would provide incentive to implement a m e
whistleblower disclosure system by reducing a corporation's
exposure to the extreme punishments imposed upon corporations,
such as criminal fines and punitive damages. This system would take
the guesswork out of incentives-based program compliance, such as

335. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 5 4 5 4 6 (1999) (protecting
corporations with internal compliance systems from punitive damages); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (providing affirmative defense in sexual harassment
cases); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (providing affirmative
COMMISSION,
U.S.
defense in sexual harassment cases); UNITEDSTATESSENTENCING
SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
MANUAL§§ 8B2.1,8C2.5 (2004) (providing substantial reduction
in penalties for corporation with effective compliance and ethics program).
336. Admittedly, given the Guidelines' recent amending in 2004 and the current
uncertainty about their application, any proposal to amend the Guidelines along these lines
may have difficulty gaining sufficient support. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,22035 (2005) (finding that the Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment).
337. See Langevoort, supva note 181, at 114-15 (noting that firms should not be
absolved of vicarious liability simply for installing monitoring systems because firms need to
internalize sanctions for wrongdoing in order to have incentive to develop a sound compliance
program)
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the OSG, and also ensure that corporations spent an appropriate
amount of resources on the system.338

C. Addressing the Noise Problem
A second problem with the Structural Model is that
whistleblower disclosure channels may be too successful. They may
open the floodgates for employee dissatisfactions related to a wide
range of injustices, real and perceived.339 Indeed, a common
occurrence after the introduction of a hotline or other disclosure
channel is for employee complaints to increase.340This "noise"
problem could be a significant concern for any system that requires
reporting to be channeled to directors, such as the system mandated
by Section 301. Increasing the burden on directors may require
corporations to compensate directors more generously in order to
find qualified and independent individuals.341A particularly active
whistleblower disclosure channel may only ampli@ these concerns.
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model can be improved to address
this issue. Specifically, the SEC might promulgate rules permittingbut not requiring-certain restrictions on the systems to reduce the
burden on directors. For example, the SEC could specify that
directors may outsource the reporting requirement to a third-party
or permit the corporation to install an ombudsman to supervise the
system. In either case, the recipient of whistleblower disclosures must
provide regular reports to the audit committee regarding the number
and types of complaints made through the system. Furthermore, the
recipient should be responsible solely to the audit committee, not to
a corporate executive. This recipient would provide the audit

338. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 2 3
LEGALSTUD.833, 842-43 (1994) (noting that corporations will spend less on detection of
criminal acts if there is not sufficient reduction in fines and penalties for these self-enforcement
efforts because additional enforcement expenditures would increase expected criminal liability
by detecting more crime).
339. Cf: Sturm, supra note 129, at 502 (describing an employee call center that fields
hundreds of thousands of calls as pan of an internal grievance system at Intel).
340. See id. at 508 (noting that after the adoption of an internal grievance system at Intel
"the number of employee complaints increased substantially").
341. There is evidence that directors are becoming increasingly burdened by SarbanesOxley's numerous requirements. See James S. Linck et al., Effects and Unintended Consequences
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Corporate Boards, AM. FIN. ASS'N 2006 MEETINGS,May 16,
2006, at 4 (noting that small public firms are disproportionately impacted by these higher
costs).
J.

committee with a valuable service. At the same time, the audit
committee would retain the independent control and review
necessary to avoid managerial blocking and filtering of disclosures.
Finally, the SEC might shield the audit committee from
disclosures regarding de minimis or nonmaterial offenses. This
limitation would ensure that directors preserve oversight over the
most important information, but are not overburdened by
insignificant complaints. The limits placed on such disclosures might
include only reporting information to the audit committee that, if
true, would necessitate public disclosure in light of previous public
filings. Such a limit would essentially incorporate the definition of
"materiality" from federal securities laws regulating public disclosure
in other contexts.
While these suggestions may give discretion to a non-director to
filter whistleblower disclosures, the danger is minimized because
independent directors would ultimately be responsible for the
system. Unlike what occurred at Enron after Sherron Watkins
reported misconduct to Ken Lay-where
a corporate executive
appointed a conflicted law firm to "investigate" the disclosures342under this proposal directors would be charged with appointing and
supervising the review process. Directors, rather than corporate
executives, would be responsible for determining what is "material"
and what should be disclosed publicly. Moreover, such limitations
may simply be a practical necessity for large corporations with tens of
thousands of employees.
Approving certain restrictions to the disclosure system could save
corporations from implementing overly rigorous and inefficient
structures in an attempt to satisfjr Sarbanes-Oxley's ambiguous
mandate. For example, some corporations may not need all of the
bells and whistles of a full ombudsman program and would benefit
from the set cost of a third-party system. Currently, the vague nature
of Sarbanes-Oxley might cause a corporation to install a system more
extensive than is necessary to meet the statute's requirements. Such a
system might ultimately be more comprehensive, but it may not
provide any marginal benefit to the corporation or its employees.
Providing absolute minimums for the disclosure channel permits a
corporation to balance its need for directors to have time and energy
to oversee the actual business activities of the corporation with the
342. See srrpra text accompanying notes 65-68.
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need to oversee Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement for a whistleblower
disclosure system.

VI. CONCLUSION
Recent corporate scandals demonstrated that, despite the efforts
of a few employee whistleblowers, many corporate employees failed
to report the misconduct they observed. Problems with information
flow from employees to traditional corporate monitors undermined
the ability of employees to perform any monitoring role effectively.
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model presents an improved attempt
to encourage corporate employees to overcome these flow-ofinformation problems. The Model should lead to more employee
whistleblowing because it better corresponds with employee
motivations and reduces the most prominent disincentives to
whistleblowing. Also, the Model will likely improve the effectiveness
of whistleblower disclosures because it encourages reporting directly
to independent corporate directors who have the authority and
responsibility to respond to information about wrongdoing.
Though this better Model has limitations, those limitations can
be addressed. The vagueness of Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements has
the potential to both under- and over-produce whistleblower
complaints. Like other attempts to implement effective compliance
systems, it will be possible for corporations to utilize disclosure
systems that are mere "window-dressing," thus resulting in too few
whistleblower disclosures. Requiring corporations to publicly
disclose information about their systems-and the results achieved
through those systems-may
reduce this cheating problem.
Additionally, permitting some safe harbor for corporations that
satisfjr a pre-approval process performed by an external entity may
permit more external oversight of the effectiveness of whistleblower
disclosure systems.
Conversely, a direct channel to the board of directors may result
in too many disclosures, overwhelming the directors. The SEC
might first explicitly permit directors to outsource their oversight of
the whistleblower disclosure channel as long as the responsibility for
the channel remains with the directors. Next, the SEC could
promulgate specific, approved restrictions and options to reduce the
burden on directors while still facilitating the transfer of information
about corporate misconduct from front-line employees to the
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corporate monitors with the authority and responsibility to address
the wrongdoing.
These reforms will help Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model
encourage employees to play an active role in monitoring corporate
behavior-a role that not only benefits society by reducing corporate
misconduct, but also improves corporate decision-making by
increasing employee voice within the corporation.

